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ABSTRACT
The problem of this thesis is to determine Mill's understanding 
of the concept of liberty, end the type of contemporary criticism it 
received. A consideration of the formation of the concept through the 
education of Mill, and of the influences exerted on him, helped to 
explain to some extent the reason why he produced the Interpretation 
of liberty that he exposed. Bis definition of liberty consisted of 
three points or elements that were eventually reduced to two basic 
principlesj the first claims for the individual complete freedom of 
thought, speech, and action; the second concedes to society the 
rights to limit the freedom of the individual only in the name of 
the liberties of the other individuals who make up society.
In the majority of cases, M s  critics attacked Mill's theory 
of knowledge in order to weaken the position of M s  doctrine of liberty. 
Since he would not accept their belief in objective, immutable truth, 
or recognise an objective norm of morality, M s  doctrine was branded 
as no more than an opinion, which was only valid for its author. In 
the practical order, M s  ideas enjoyed some measure of success in 
affecting government changes and in attaining a number of reforms in 
relation to Individual and social freedoms.
Mill assumed that every man is a law unto himself, and that 
his freedom was absolute, ^hat he failed to see was that the end of 
man was perfect liberty in (Sod. The role of Society is to aid man in
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Attaining hia and by placing laws about hla human, and therefore 
defective, nature. Thase laws are based on the diwine law, both 
natural and revealed, and are interpreted in the social order for the 
good of the Individual.
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THE FORMATION OF J.S. MILL'S DOCTRINE OF LIBESTI
It nay be said feat Jbhn Stuart Mill was carefully prepared for 
his role in English thought in the nineteenth century* In order that the 
younger Mill would be prepared to carry on the Utilitarian tradition, 
James Mill, with the encouragement of his close friend JCreqy Bentham, 
undertook the strange experiment feat was his son's education* This in** 
Structtlon began when the boy was only two years of age, and prominent in 
fee course were the Ideals of liberty, freedom, and democracy* It is not 
necessary to give in detail fee list of ancient classical, philosophical, 
and historical authors and works which John Mill mastered as a boy* It 
will be sufficient to say feat a very wide reading in these subjects, as 
well as in English Literature, and an intense training in Latin, Greek, 
and Mathematics under fee direction of his father and Bentham, all con** 
stituted a most unique type of education completed at a very early age*
Among fee many books feat he read may be found the following
works which contributed to his early consideration of libertyt Moshsia's
Ecclesiastical History, M'Crie's Knox, and two histories of the Quakers*
Mil's comment regarding this aspect of his education is as followsi
I have mentioned at how early an age he made me a reader of 
eeeleaiaatieal history! and he taught me to take the strong­
est interest in the Reformation, as the great and decisive 
contest against priestly tyranny for liberty of thought*-**
*John Stuart Mill, Autobiography (New Xorkt Columbia U. Press, 
192b) p* 21, Preface by Johnmi,®&bBoss,
1
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James Hill was forming what was to be on© of his son's greatest Intel*
lectual interests, the description and defense of liberty* and the younger
Mill was not yet eight years old*
During a part of this period, from 181U to 181?, there was another
influence on the formulation of Mill* s utilitarian thought* Jhreay
Bentham took up residence, in the summers, at Fort Abbey in Somersetshire,
and the younger Hill spent many of his leisure hours with him, thus re*
oelving a direct influence in the principle of iftilltarlaalsm that had
net formerly been present*
It was in this same period that he was introduced to the work of
Malthus and Rioardo, and to his father's theories of political economy*
In respect to this part of his education, a contemporary remarks*
We must remember, however, that while his father could 
not be expected to teach him everything, yet, in point 
of fact, there were a few things that he could and did 
teach effectually! one of these was Logic* the others 
were Political Bbonosy, Historical Philosophy and - 
Politics, all which were eminently his own subjects*
Mill himself speaks of this aspect of his education in glowing terns,
"I do not believe that any scientific teaching ever wae more thorough,
or better fitted for training the faculties, than the node in which
logic and political econony were taught to me by ay father."2 In this
connection, the essay by Hobbes, Coagmtatlo Sirs Logics* was highly
esteemed by MUX senior, but his son thought little of it* Jbhn Mill
was, however, absorbing the ideas that were to form his philosophical
^Alexander Bain, Jbhn Stuart Hill (London* Longman's Green, 
it Co*, 1882) p* 26*
2 Jbhn Stuart Hill, Autobiography* p* 20*
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3
views and mike him a leading force to English political and ethical 
ideas* It nay be said then, that tola education gam Mat the combined 
Ideas of < t a w  Bentham, Janee MIH, Bicardo, and ffelthns* He received 
the principle# of utility mainly fxm his father who had taken them 
ever and made them into a political foreef tentoan himself had not been 
capable of perfowing toe cork of application and dames Hill was toe 
type needed £or the exploitation of his ideas* But toe younger Mill mas 
still far from a complete appreciation of toe doctrine as Bentham had 
fonsOated it) toe cork of formation mas, however, progressing steadily*
Two visits to franco, the first to IfiSO and the second to 1830, 
brought him face to toes, to a dramatic way, with toe rereluitonary
were current on the O n t U
sent*
During the first of these visits, from the fifteenth of May, 
1080, until July of 1821, Mill stayed with the family of f»lr Samuel 
Benthos, the brother of Jeremy Bentham* During his stay, he read and 
wrote French frenaledly, so as to learn the language as eptokly and 
perfectly as pesetolei and chief among ware those of
Voltaire, The coneecusnt familiarity with the French language and 
literature gave rise to a new interest and a better grasp of the poli­
tics and social oondRtlons of that country* After his return to England, 
he leapt in constant touch with toe publications and protOem# of the 
Gcnttoent, and he reed this bax&ground to keep M s  countrymen informed 
concernto^ toe cewaediiy they <ftd not possess, liberty of thought, ere 
pression, and todlvtorelity* Disregarding all of the educational aide
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he experienced at this tin®. Mill believed that*
it® greatest, perhaps, of the many advantages which I 
m m  to this episode in ray education, was that of hav­
ing breathed for a whole year, the free and genial 
life of Continental atmosphere. This advantage was 
not the lose real thought I could not then estimate, 
nor even consciously feel it*1
Mill was fully eamdneed that freedom of any kind hardly existed in his
own country, and he believed that liberty* in its true sense, was a
monopoly held by the Continent, and particularly by France,
During this visit to France, he became acqiainted with M, Say,2
/ whom he describee in M s  Autobiography as ^enlightened,* and *a fine
specimen of the best kind of French Republican,*3 who would not bow to
Bonaparte, but demanded the liberty of the Republic that was based on
the rights of the individual* K# Say was familiar with the leaders of
the Liberal party and he introduced Mill to many of these men and their
ideas* One of the outstanding personages h© met was Saint-Simon who
was then considered a clever original, although he had not yet formulated
a new philosophy* the main influence that Mill received from this group,
and frora feds association with then, was, as fee himself states i
A strong and permanent interest in Cosstinmtal Idber- 
alisn, of which I ever afterwards kept ayself su courant.
%bid*, pp« Uo4il,
2«Iean Baptists Say was a French economist whose Traits 
d *Econc«iie PoHtl qae roused the French govemraent againsOBSTin 1803*
£i a reamt o# 'ms later' works, Da l'Analetsrre at dee Anglais and a 
revised edit! cm of his Traits* 1» waoap;oin^d toa pro/ossorahip in 
industrial economy at ' Boneervatoire des Arts et Metiers in 18&5>*
In 1831 he become professo*. of political economy at the College de France*
3j©fen Stuart Mill, AutobioEraohy. p* U2*
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as much Aa.of English politics* a thing not at all 
usual in iSlse days with Englishmen, and which had 
a very salutary Influence on ay development, keep- 
ing as free from tha error always prevalent in 
England, and from which even my father with all his 
superiority to prejudice was not exempt, of judging 
universal questions by a merely English standard*4
Mill returned to England the following year and began to read Roman law 
with Mr. Austin after his father decided that he should become a lawyer* 
As an accompaniment to this work, dames Mill gave his son the Traits de 
Legislation by Dumont* This was an interpretation of the principle 
speculation of Bentham, and Mill calls the incident a turning point in 
his mental history* He now believed that he understood the principle 
of utility as Bentham intended that it should be understood* The three 
volumes of the Traits caused all of his pre-eonoelved, but Confused and 
unistegrated, ideas to fall into place around the principle of utility,
• "as the keystone which held together the detached and fragmentary com­
ponent parts of my knowledge and beliefs* Zt gave unity to my conceptions 
1
of things*1,2 ‘ This was the moment of the coalescence of his philosophy 
that was so thoroughly ingrained fcy the time he realised its presence 
that when later he disapproved of many of its parts, he could not find 
it within his power to break with it completely. His reading for this 
year also included a history of the French Bevolution, in which topic 
he became thoroughly versed in succeeding years*
In the vidtite of the year of 1822-23 the Utilitarian Society 
was formed and inaugurated in the house of JCremy Bentham* Zt was
1|bid., p. 13*
2Xbld*. p. 1*7.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6
couponed of young men professing utility as their standard in ethics and 
polities, and who desired to discuss questions relating to that princi­
ple* A number of MtH'8 earlier Ideas received their flail formulation 
in the society discussions*
' In the summer of 1013 mil wrote his first argumentative essay 
which was published in the traveller and which he said was,«aa attack
on what X regarded as the aristocratic prejudice, that the rich were,/
or were likely to be, superior in moral qualities to the poor*"1 Mean*.
while he contributed letters and articles to the Morning Chronicle*
Also during this year} the Ttestminater Be view was proposed by Bentham
as an organ for the Philosophic Radicals so that they might bring their
opinions before the public as freely as they desired. Mill states that
the problem they faced was that!
Freedom of discussion even in polities, much more in 
religion, was at that time far from being, even in 
theory, the conceded point which it at least seems 
to be nowj and the holders of obnoxious opinions had 
to be always reatfy to argue and redargue for the 
liberty of expressing them*2 1
' The question of freedom of speech was a familiar one to Mill and his
contemporaries at this point, for their opinions were considered revo-
V
lutlonary and something to be smothered before they became widespread*
In March of 182h the first number of the Westminster Bevlcw was 
published, and between 1821* end 182? John MB.il contributed hirteen 
articles to it* These were reviews of books on histozy and political
1Ibid*, p* 50*
2Ibid*, p. 61*
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economy, and discussions on special political topics such as the corn 
Ians* the game laws, and the laws of libel. On© of these early articles 
is particularly important to this discussion} it is, “The first article 
in the third number (July, l82lt) is on the Csrlile Persecutions, and, I 
have no doubt, is hls.ŵ  This particular piece of work is his first 
published expression ref erring directly to his opinions on liberty and 
freedom of speech and thought*
In later years in his Autobiography. Mill gives a specific 
summary of this period of his life and the battle which he was waging, 
in company with the Philosophic Uadioals, through the Westminster 
Beview in favour of freedoms
/ At this period, when liberalism seemed to be becoming 
the tone of the time. when iworovement of institutions 
was preached from the highest places, and a complete 
change of the eonSHLtution of Parliament was loudly 
demanded in the lowest, it is not strange that attention 
should have been roused by the regular appearance in 
controversy of what seemed a new school of writer*, 
claiming to be the legislators and theorists of this 
new tendency, the air of strong conviction with which 
they wrote, when ̂ scarcely any one else seemed to have 
an equally strong faith in as definite a creed} the 
boldness with which they tilted against the very front 
of both the existing political parties} their uncom­
promising profession of opposition to many of the 
generally received opinions, and the suspicion they 
lay under of holding others still more heterodox 
than they professed} the talent and verve of at least 
ay father* s articles, and the appearance of a corps 
behind him sufficient to carry oh a review} and 
finally, the fact that the review was bought and
Stuart Mill, p. 33* Hehard Oarlile was 
an admirer of Jeremy Benl&am and' a f^otbinker with a propensity for 
getting himself into trouble. When the Black Dwarf, a weekly London 
publication, was banned as obnoxious literature, CarlUe proceeded to 
sell copies of it in secret, The editor of the paper, Steill, was 
arrested and Carlile cane into prominence when he offered to take the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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road, made tho so-called Bentham school in Philosophy 
and politico fill a greater place in the public mind 
than it had held before, or haa ever again held since 
other equally earnest schools of thought have arisen 
in England.1'
This statement of the situation indicates definitely the place of Hill 
and his contemporaries in the early nineteenth century political arena 
as the champions of the new liberalism; they were at first the only 
men groped together for the specific purpose of defying the govern­
ment and demanding the common liberties in economics, politics, and
isociety.
In 1825 Hill edited Bentham* a book on Evidence, and founded the 
Speculative Debating Society. And in the following year the Utilitarian 
gro'<g> broke up. These were ccmonplace activities in KUl*s buey life, 
but beneath it all an intellectual struggle was forming. There arose 
in his mind a doubt as to the value of the ends which he had set up 
for himself under the guidance of his father. He had reached a point 
of mental saturation which was coupled with a physical break down, as 
indicated by hie friend Bain, “the dejection so feelingly depicted was
editor is place in the interests of freedom of the press. When he was 
refused this honour, he edited political parodies at a great rate until 
M s  arrest in 181?. When acquitted, he carried on his crusade, and by 
the end of October of 181£ he had six indictments against him. Event** 
ally his family and friends were being arrested regularly for attempting 
to defend the freedom of the press. Oarlile thus attained notoriety as 
a protector of free spedch and individual rights. His efforts are on a 
par with the French Ite volution of 1830 as factors in the extension of 
free speech rights In England.
•̂fohn Stuart Mill, Autobiography, p. 70.
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due to physical causes, and that the chief of thews causes was over­
working the b r a i n * A t  this tine, Hill expezlenced a great feeling of 
dejection and listleesnsss in which he could not enjoy any type of recrea­
tion, pleasure, or rest#
In this frame of mind it occurred to m  to put "the 
question directly to ayaelf * “Suppose that all your 
objects in life were realised; that all the changes 
in institutions and opinions which you are looking 
forward to, could be completely effected at this 
instant! would this be a great joy and happiness to 
you?* And an Irrepressible self-consciousness 
distinctly answered, “Hot * At that ny heart sank 
within me; the whole foundation on which ny life 
was constructed fell down*”
this was the beginning of the intellectual break with the form of Utili­
tarianism proposed by his father and Jsreny Bentham* Mill realised that 
he could not turn to his father for help, since Junes Mill had conducted 
his sonfs education on the basis of that principle that the younger 
Mill now questioned* He understood that his problem was beyond tie 
power of any remedy his father might propose* Too, since all of his 
friends were steeped in the very tradition that he was forsaking, he 
haul no one idiom he could consult* It now seemed to Mill that regard for 
the public good was too vague an end for the satisfaction of man*s needs* 
He m w  that there was some element lacking in the strict principle of 
utility, that if the needed ref eras in society and government were effect­
ed, and freedom was extended to all in the community so that each indi­
vidual achieved a state of physical comfort, “the pleasures of life,
•̂ Bain, Jaha Stuart Mill* p* 38*
g«fehn Stuart Mill, Autobiography* p* 9k*
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being no longer kept up by struggle and privation, would cease to be 
pleasures."I At first he had no idea where to look for the solution 
of his problem. It was quite by accident that he was led to the answer 
in the recognition of emotion as a necessary part of a happy life and a 
balanced mentality. He had been raised by his father in the Platonic 
tradition of th© condemnation of poetry as a waste of intellectual ener­
gy and a source of unnecessary and misleading feelings*
In this state of disillusionment, Mill chanced to pick up a 
copy of Wordsworth1 s poetry and he read it as a possible source of recre­
ation) in it he apparently found the answer to hie problemj his mind was 
opened to new ideas from all quarters. The choice of Wordsworth, out of 
all the English poets whom he might have read, suggests a certain af­
finity between Mill's mind, as -earlier influenced by french literature, 
and the philosophy of Wordsworth with its emphasis on the importance of 
th© individual, which also had a french background* He discovered in 
the poems, descriptions of feelings that he had experienced but could 
not explain, or admitj h© realized that he had discovered a, "source of 
inward joy, of sympathetic and imaginative pleasure, which could be 
shared in by all human beings*"^ This pleasure that could be equally 
shared by all had no connection however with the struggle or imperfections 
of society) it would be the source of inward happiness that remained 
when all of the evil® of society were remedied. This was the basis for
^Ibld,» p. 102,
2Xbfd*. p. 10h,
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tin creation of a new IMlltarianiam which Hill held, and defended, for* 
the remainder of his life* It m e  a utility that admitted beauty, feel­
ing, virtue, end ultimately, a Uni of Deis*.
Hill gradually emerged frem this aental oriels end never experi­
enced the proven again, but he continued to read the works of Wordsworth 
in appreciation for what they had done for bin* He turned M s  studies 
now to Coleridge, Goethe, and Carlyle) and he found mush in the theories 
of the Soint-Simonions, who wore beginning to exsri their influence in 
France2’, and in Auguste Cents* From these authors he received hie first 
reaction in the direction of Saddles. His view of hvsanity was great­
ly broadened, he delighted in poetry for the soke of poetry, his contro­
versial attitude beease sore placable, and he acquired a hatred for 
seetazlaaisn. Xn the fallowing years, Hill continued to contribute to 
the periodicals while putting the finishing touches on M s  revamped phi­
losophy. In 1828 he became interested in the problem of FMlosophioal 
necessity and he worked out the solution that he eventually included in 
the Logic. The year 182? witnessed his withdrawal from the Speculative 
Debating Society so that he could cany on M s  studies privately and
to moke premature state-
ments regarding his results*
^"Thelr criticisms on the common doctrines of liberalism seemed 
to me full Of important truth) and it was partly by their writings that 
ay eyes were opened to the very limited c m  temporary value of the old 
political eoonosy, which assumes private property and inheritance os 
indefeasible facts, and freedom of production and exchange as the 
dernier wot of social Improvement.” Ibid., p. 117.
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la 1831 Mill met r«* Harriet ?5ardy Taylorf this friendship did 
not calnimte in marriage for twenty years, until V* Taylor died, bat 
it influenced M m  to such an extent that the marriage ie considered the 
third ami final phase of Me life* This w a a  influenced M e  thought. 
M e  node of expreeel on. M e  tendencies, and, in particular, the for­
mation and production of the eeeey On liberty and ite companion pieces* 
In 183$, Sir Lilian MaEUmorth founded the Lcadont shortly 
afterwards hi bought the l^etMnBter Berleif and united the two publi-
m eaM M eM M neewiieaM M n e iM H R iM i *
cations with Mill ee editor* Eventually Fill bought the paper himself * 
rMle he ms  editing the London and W»stajaetcr lesion* he also wrote 
arttdoe in the gaoeainer on French polities, having became inflamed 
with the subject haring hie 1830 visit to the Continent after the July 
Eevolution* Q m  of the chief aims of the Beview was the propagation of 
the ideas of the Philosophic itadicale, but its editor accepted articles 
written by representatives of the opposing schools of thought In tbs 
interests of liberal progress*
'hiring M s  lifetime, MU! produced the major works which follow 
in their chronological order* la tbs jesrs I83O and I83I dll wrote the 
five essays which were later published aider the title of Essays on 
Tom 'foeettled Oiest’ons of Political The year lQ4i saw the
publication of the System of Logic* which is an erpdLrieal view of logic 
based an M e  father1® psychology, and '’our year# later the Prinelpios 
of Political Kecatamr speared* T-jo years after Ms marriage In 1851, 
“ill produced The SnfirancMaeasnt of Women in which nay be recognised 
the combination of i''ca® of liberty and feminism, a special evidence of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the influence of Harriet Saylor Hill# M U  aaid later that he always 
had the principle in Mud but it was aim who formulated it and anooureged 
Itia to write tide ideas down# in 1356 Mars# Hill died, and in tribute .to 
her mmry he published tii» essay On liberty as it then stood, although 
they had been marking on it together and had intended to revise it onoe 
store during the winter of 1353* Between 1359 and 1375 ho wrote the 
aeries that eventually appeared as Blasertations and ̂ laeuasioas# and in 
and in 1361 the ConaldeieUoae on aepresentative Oaernaent was put into 
print# In 1363 the Utilitarianism cans out* it was the new system he had 
foxuulated and it tends to weaken rather than strengthen the general view 
on utility# It is the Isasi convincing of his works since he makes so 
assy changes that th«#re is little left of the original creed* In the 
year 1865 he finished An ..Jtaa&aation of Sir Willis* BeaHton** .’Mloaophy 
and Augusts Coats and aMriLtlvl3a» is this saae year Hill m s  eleoted to 
3erllaa»nt from Westadnster and he went forward to champion his views and 
those of the Philosophic Radicals until 1368* After his retirement from 
Parliament, he finished tie Subjection of Women* He died in 1373* and 
after his death the Autobiography and three Essays on Cliaion were pub­
lished*
la the ensuing axasiaatiens of Hill's wort* with a view to 
arriving at a definite notion of what he meant by "liberty? it has been 
.naoeeaary to linlt the area of study to oertain phases of his literary 
•n.viuies and to certain publications and periodicals considered to be 
representative of his thought* The examination WL11 begin, thexefore, 
with Ids earliest published ideas on the problsn.
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HILL’S WRITINGS CONCERNING LIBERTX
Mil began writing on the problem of freedom as early as 1321; 
in his first articles in the Westminster %ylsw« The first essay to be 
considered is that on religious prosecution, in relation to the Oarlile 
Persecutions mentioned above* This essay appeared in the third number 
under the title of On the Recent Perseoutions of Persons Vending Books 
Against Christianity* An Address to Deists, by a Dissenter* The work 
is a rather prolonged recapitulation of the situation under consideration 
and a listing of those involved, with appropriate remarks as to why they 
are considered part of the argument* The first point of note is his 
declaration that there is no infallible authority to decide in such 
cases of disagreement of opinion* This principle is used consistently 
by Mill in a import of the right of freedom of discussion* In this par­
ticular case he applies it to religion since certain persons were being 
prosecuted for denying adherence to what was considered by many to be 
the State Religion of England* And even further, it was considered a 
crime to deny belief in God* But Mill defended what he considered an 
inherent right to disagree with customary beliefs when he sayst
The existing religion of any country either is, or 
is not, susceptible of improvement* If the former, 
allowing it to be the province of the government 
to decide what is an improvement, and how it should
111
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be made, the freest discussion of its snerlts should 
be authorised as the best mode of fhraishlng mater­
ials for a reformation.1
It will be apparent as the paper proceeds that he co ild not see a con- 
sistent middle position ill this problem* or m y  problem in any way in­
volving freedom of the Individual or of grotqpsf either there must be 
absolute freedom of discussion or there mas despotism, fie Indicated too 
that if people sere repaired by Iasi to adhere to a belief* there would 
result an hypocrisy that would be a greater evil than nonwconltormity# 
"The evened unbeliever may become a bad many the hypocrite is a bad 
man.** Over and o*mr In this paper Mill points out the necessity of 
allowing discussion in order to progress and this is Ms main argument 
in favour of the publishers of the heretleal booksy if Christianity is 
string enough and true to Itself it need not fear uest^on or argument. 
The paper ends with the plea* wfcr e<-ual justice to believer and un­
believer-* so that the government may not* ttadd to the misfortune of 
Infidelity the privation of civil rights* and the endurance of legal 
ponalties*ff3
If an attempt were made to outline the principles wldch emerge 
~>oa this first essay on the -uestion f liberty of dlscuaaion it might 
be oald that in the first .place there is no infallible authority to which
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disagreements of opinion nay be subedited} secondly, if the gomrwienfc 
attempts to enforce it# vines the result is a greater erll, for there is 
no riddle way betmm absolute freedom of discussion and the tyranny of 
lav* Finally* the only hope of progress in hanan affairs is provided by 
absolute freedom of discussion*
The mxt najor essay concerning the problem of r! ghts appeared 
la the 'featnjnster Revieu of April iBflSf under the title Ob the lew of 
Ubel and freedom of the Press# She article begins with this striking 
obeervaticoi
Tbs lav of Inland is as vmfavouraKLe to the liberty of 
the press* as that of the »st teepotic govermcnt 
which has over existed} and* oonae<?iently****what over 
degree of that liberty is enjoyed in this country* 
exists, not in conse nance ~f the low, but in spite 
of it.*
And continuing m  this these* he charges the government with being tyran­
nical in its suppression not of falsehood but of true and important 
opinions, thereby protecting its own position at the expense of the 
rights of individuals t
But there are nary subjects, and these the met important 
of all* on which it is the Interest of the jovcrraent* 
not that the people shosld think right but* on the contra­
ry, that they should think wongi on these subjects, there­
fore* the govemnefxt is cults sure* If it has the power* 
to suppress, riot the false and rdeohlcvous opinions but 
the peat and lmortant truths*2
Bore .111 represents a great body of revolutionary ideas - which 0. K. 
Chesterton claim m s  sufficient to ham brought about a revolution In
i^estnliMter Review®* III, p*?86*
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England comparable to, "those of France - had not the revolution of the 
poor against the rich been foiled by a revolution of the rich against 
the poor."*
In the article Mill indicates the dangers which ensue from 
government control of thought through libel laws and control of the press* 
Once again, the question arises as to who will be the judge, the infalli­
ble arbiter, of what is good and what is bad* Here he emphatically states 
what was assumed in the former article, that there can be no line of 
demarcation, "to decide what opinions shall be permitted, and what pro­
hibited* To make this llna, he says, would be to choose the opinions 
that the people are to hold, and like the religious views mentioned 
above, the choice of all opinion is a right of the individual to be 
enjoyed in full* And again he repeats and makes clear, "there is no 
medium between perfect freedom of expressing opinions, and absolute 
despotism**3 This conviction is the source of a great deal of his 
difficulty, for if Mill had been able to see a sort of via media between 
these two extremes, he might have been able to clear up some of the 
difficulties which caused confusion in his writings and distress in his 
own mind as to the manner of resolving the opposition between liberty 
and authority. In this essay he appeals to public opinion as the chief
■*tl* K* Chesterton, The Victorian Age in literature, 12th ed* 
(London* Thornton Btttterworik Ltd*, 1^31 ), p. Id*
S. Mill, "Westminster Review," 11, p, 289*
3Ibid«, pp. 289-290*
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m&xus through which freedom of discussion may bo gained* And again ho 
repeats the principle that free discussion is the instruoont of pro­
gress, that, "under a free system, if error would be promulgated, so 
would truthi and truth never fails, in the long run, to prevail over 
eiror*"* He dleoueees the intoleraaoe and despotism of the aneient 
rulers before a constitution was in force, and points out that the 
reason them unconstitutional rulers nuasled the press was that they be­
lieved that the combos man Is unable to fore correct opinions because of 
ignorance. Thai he states that the ignorance itself is due to the lack of 
free discussion, "Discussion, therefore, has a necessary tendency to 
rowdy its own evils."2 The false opinions that .make their appearance 
must be tolerated for the sake of truth since, he repeats, it is im- 
possible to draw the line between true and false opinions! the problem 
must work itself out over a period of time and the truth will neces­
sarily win out* The rest of the essay deals with the use of invective 
in argument, the prohibition of which limits free speech* The general 
idea is that anything which in any way restricts the absolute liberty 
of the press is reducible to the evil of choosing opinions for the 
people to hold under duress* After a discussion of law he svbm up»
The two following conclusions may now, we thinly be 
regarded as fully established! that the law of Kngland, 
as delivered by its authorised interpreters, the judges, 
however earnestly the same judges may occasionally
htod., p. 2?1*
Ibid., p. 2p2>.
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disavow this doctrine, prohibits all unfavourable 
representation with respect to institutions, and 
with respect to government and its actst
And, consequently, that If aqjr freedom of dis­
cussion is permitted to exist, It is only because 
it cannot be repressed! the reason why it cannot - 
be repressed, being, the dread of public opinion*
Thus, free discussion concerns everyone in the community and it is the 
duty of every non, as an individual, to see that the right is maintained 
and used properly*
Zt say be concluded, therefore, that the principles outlined in 
this essay areJ first, the government is suppressing truths that may be 
hurtful to itself by auasllng the press and misapplying the laws of 
llbelj second, there is no intermediate position between absolute 
freedom and absolute tyranny in setters of expression! last, public 
opinion is the instrument through which freedom of discussion is to be 
attained and maintained.
The chief importance of the Sjyetea of logic with reference to 
this research lies in the fact that whereas Necessity and Freedom, as 
philosophic notions, are usually considered as contradictories, 
characteristically Hill resolves the contradiction by a modified in­
terpretation of Necessity. Hence he saysi
Correctly conceived, the doctrine called philosophical 
Necessity is simply thisi that, given the actives which 
are present to the individual's mind, and given like­
wise the character and disposition of tha individual, 
the manner in which he will act might be unerringly in­
ferred} that if we knew the person thoroughly, and knew 
all the inducements which are acting upon him, we could
1Ibid., pp. 320-321.
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foretell M s  oooteet Mth m  m A  eevtsiiftr as ue
am p re -a c t «rgr p lp jd o til a e t**
May iouflbt, he :*p®8 oa to point out* that aosgr he fblt that action* way
;® i be f®@di©tpb3% lie s  In  the fact that I t  is  liars&y XUtely that a ll
of the cfemnsteaoes* or tte characters at those ixmlvs:4̂  be knewh
taS.th t?» ?leas?®® a t m m tm f fmmmmy fa r the protfieiiofi# Tarther*
•thsrs are physical sec-aon©©® •’M e h  ne mill ®eoese«y* as death for seat
of feed or adrj there ore other* which* os aadt cases of ceueatloa
as the 'onwr, are net soli to be neoesssrĵ *®* •laoe the slightest change
of ctsecoateneee, controllable hr to* optst* *131 cease a m«fteto change
of resu lt* ftswa aottoas are In tMs lost oeteaosy in which tees* is
Steer* roost fm  anpredietofele Inflm w O f e ith er by the pewcai 5®* by cote
tide agents* and te a n  action* is  tesnsforsi ccmtn&Uble to m  octant*
':rs has, therefore*
fa  a certain extent, a power to alter t*ts character. Its 
bsiafe lit the nXtiseite resort* fomsdt for M*** Is net in- 
ooreictent etth its being* in prt* ?<a»d |gr Ms* as one
at tim intesrte&ats agents* vss ehsneter ST famed by
M s  cttftoitetatoee* (Sixdndiiag omstig these M e  part3.cu3or 
orgsnLsstlon)* but M s  cub desire to iw&i it in a par- 
Mailer w  one of these draiwtgneee, and by no Keans 
am at the least inflnerstia.1,3
Thus i «  1® capable o f fosrsdng Ms am  charaotor os be M lls f ■’aid itoeai
tMe "‘H i  canel»des that only a person at ofoifteasd Mrttie Is ooaptetsljr
free einoe he toe tamed M e  e*n lift to the best neld* .'te»* etfh tMs
pamr aatsr Me o*n destiny* ?’*o®t harm obsolete frwrton fsr  ̂rcetmlnt to
8* M ill*  A o f  lo d e * . S e tlo s lm ttv e  sigid In d u c t!**
l«sipia»* ;:1p« b arSflS**r mil' p* ..... . r""’"”"r'r'"'Tr’"
zn m * M p* &$*
t>* i®o*
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control hlo fate in a proper manner and any unnatural interference with
tlxis freedom, and the development of virtue, is therefore a despotism
reigning over his very moral nature*
The free-will doctrine, by keeping in view precisely that 
portion of the truth which the word Necessity put* out of
sight, namely, the power of the mind to co-operate in the
formation of its own character, has given to ite adherents 
a practical feeling much nearer to the truth than has 
generally (X believe) existed in the minds of necessitarians*
The latter may have had a stronger sense of the importance 
of what human beings can do to shape the characters of one 
another, but the free-will doctrine has, I believe, foster­
ed in its supporters a much stronger spirit of self-culture.*
The fares discussion of problems tends to produce the truths men live by,
and if they are to shape their lives in the way of virtue, as free men,
they must be allowed to pursue these truths. Any restriction of liberty
results in a restriction of virtue and the production of a morally
stunted people*
In this article M U  sets out to reconcile the antinomy which 
exists between freedom and necessity. He achieves this by saying that 
if wo know all the factors which bear upon a free decision we would 
realize that the man could not decide otherwise than he does, which is 
to say that free decisions are necessitated and determined* JMs con­
clusion finds its place in his argument for freedom through his plea for 
the free discussion of all problems as providing the factors which de­
termine the decisions. These decisions may be true or false, but ne has 
professed his faith in the principle veritaa prevalebit* hence free dis­
cussion of all opinions untrameled by any legislation or control by
^bid., p. 551*
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authority is toe only forsula through *Mch truth nay be Obtained*
Thl® process which lie proposes for the dbtainnsnt of truth in hanan 
affairs is .Justified in s systsn of logic* the purpose of which is to 
provide m n with a mthod t  attaining truth*
The next and indeed the najor contribution which 1*411 mde to 
this toctrine is Ids Itaous and classical essay Oft liberty* which ap­
peared in lflj29, although it m i  written earlier end revised at least 
twice prior to publication* In fact* he and his wife had planned a 
third revision and it would appear that the esxtrwm concern and effort 
expended on this treatise* is an indication of the importance with which 
its author isrested it*
The essay On Liberty opes* with inference to the distinction 
nade in the logic cootssmlng the doctrine of Thiloeophlcal necessity*
The first sentence is* "The subject of this essay is m t  toe so-called 
liberty of the HUl* so unfortunately opposed to the satonwed doctrine 
of PMlosophlcal ’feoessltyj but Civil* or Social IAberty|"* the ns» 
ceeeity of free*® is induced Sem past evidence* so what is luft to 
distinguish tor© 1®* hi says* "the nature snd Units of the power which 
can be legitimately exerciced by society over the individual*"^ "fere 
tto issue is between the opposing principles of freedom and authority*
Tto liberty is the final statement of Kill1® Ideas on the subject*
S* ill* utilitarianism* liberty* and Pcoreeonlatlve tovem- 
rwnt (Londont J* H# ĵ̂ '̂Tirwr' do*‘* !3̂>)"* p• £>!>•
2Ibid„ p. m *
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It Is not long in the essay before he repeats the complaint against the 
present government that has been encountered previously in the earlier 
works considered. He claims that the stock phrases concerning the 
freedom of the people and their association with their* "democratic 
government” do not indicate the true state of affairsj that, "the people 
who exercise the power are not always the same people with those over 
whoa it is exercised} and the self-government spoken of is not the 
government of each lay himself, but of each by all the rest*"* There is, 
again, the implication that freedom exists in spite of the laws of the 
country and persists only through the strength of public opinion. Once 
more, he mentions the rights of the unbeliever in the religious quarrsl 
wherein the statements of the unbeliever eventually advance the cause of 
freedom!
The great writers to whoa the world owes what religious 
liberty it possesses, have mostly asserted freedom af 
conscience as an indefeasible right, and denied abso- 
lutely that a human being is accountable to others for 
his religious belief* let so natural to mankind is 
intolerance in whatever they really care about, that 
religious freedom has hardly anywhere been practically 
realized, except where religious indifference, which 
dislikes to have its peace disturbed by theological 
quarrels, has added its weight to the scale.*
Thw whole work revolves around 1his central theme that it is 
necessary to consider the negative side to every positive affirmation 
and of, "laying down, side by side, with every proposition, the counter-
1Ibid., p. 67.
2Ibid., p. 71.
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:>z~mo2itionmnl  towards the end af bis iatrodaotoiy portion state* 
Ids intention In ths essay* to assert the principle* "that -the sole end 
for which nanSdnd ere warranted, individually os* collectively* in  inter­
fering with the lib erty  of action of aw  of their araber is self- 
psrot@etl<aw,?̂  Si the last few pages of the preface are found the utili­
tarian ideas be applies in the construction of Ida principle of lib erty  
m  an ethical efaesttaa* **I regard u t ility  m  the u ltlm te  appeal on 
all ethical rusetionej but it mm% be u tility  in die largest sense* 
grounded on the pemansat interest® of a nan as a progressive being#"3 
In tills statenent is contained tin ipm of f i l l  *a whole crusadej thatI
for the 3aim of :lan *3 greatest happiness* which is attained oily through 
progress* them oust esdst -a str ict freedom which is the tool of pro press 
of thought* w d |  and deeds "The only freedom which teserves the name* 
is that of pursuing our am  good in our own way* so long as we do not 
attempt to deprive otlwra of tlislrs* or inpeds tlsdr efforts to obtain 
il#»k Freedom consists in the pursuit of good or virtue but -that 
freedom is Halted by ram1® obligati on to the other miira of society 
wtx3 have- an counl right to attain virtue#
'Hie second chapter Is built around three assumptions* first* 
that an opinion authtafitatlvwly ©spresseed ms be tm©$ see.vxt# the
3-aiexnnder n.rdn# doha Stuart ,111* p* 10U#
£# f i l l ,  Cn Liberty# pp# 7?-73#
W d * . P. 1km
Îbi-i#, p . 75#
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opinion may be false, but he goes on to show the necessity of keeping 
the opposite view of each opinion before the mind, in  order that the 
opinion may keep its  v lta iity j las t, appears M ill's  favourite theoiy, 
that conflicting doctrines usually share the truth between them and, 
therefore, each must be examined thoroughly and honestly* This chapter 
is , therefore, an exposition of the liberty of thought and discussion 
in  which are treated religious freedom and freedom of the press, as well 
as the rights of criticism and invective. M ill begim with the prin­
c ip le , " If  a ll  mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one 
person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justi­
fied  in  silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would 
be justified  in silencing mankind."* This is the statement of the abso­
lute right of the individual to hold an opinion, ligh t or wrong, in  de­
fiance of a l l  standards and customs. He bases this idea on the principle 
that remains unchanged in  a l l  his works, that to silence any opinion is 
an assumption of in fa llib ility , which in  its e lf is an e v il equal to that 
of suppression of rights. He repeats again his case against bigotry 
and intolerance on the level of human relations and of government, 
stressing that, "there is  no such thing as absolute certainty*"2 The 
theme of progress through freedom of discussion, coupled with that of 
the sovereignty of man over his own destiny, reappears in this chapter 
in  the statement, "The whole strength and value, then, of human
1Ibid** p. 79.
2Ib id ., p. 81*
57343
r- - - -  - • .
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jnd^psnt, depending on the one property, that it can be set right when 
It ie wrong, reliance can be placed on It only when the mane of sett* 
lag it right are kept constantly at hand*"* The closest approach to 
certainty any opinion, says BUI, is that the opinion has withstood 
the trst of its opposite again and Jgaln| and these are the opinions 
that mat be upheld by public support* Continuing trds theme, he says 
further that axy opinion which ie eontrary to the truth has no utility 
and in tfaty nay truth will triumph hr Its eery usefulness to mankind* 
Thors is repeated, too, the attsek;c|tftthoBs who would dictate 
what religious beliefs should be held and echoes the thought contained 
in the article <u»te<! abww from the Westminster ISevleir* Toftum IX* lie 
says, ftbut I mast be permitted to observe, that it fa not the feeling 
sure of a doctrine (be it what it may) which 1 call an assumption of 
infallibility*’’? This Is allowable sines a sincere belief Is a right 
of the free man as long as the belief Is not forced on to others* How* 
ever, M s  objection is to, ’’the undertaking to decide that --uestion for 
other*, without allowing them to hear what can be said on t'e contrary 
slde*,*3 fie goes m  to note that truth triumphs and advances through 
Asoussion, but will not rise above persecution! in fact, it cannot sur­
vive a persistent persecution* This truth that has be&a forcibly put
^tbld*, p* 02* 
?Ibld*. p. 85. 
%oe.clt*
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down w ill be rediscovered and m y  flourish again; only, however, i f  I t
ie  found in  favourable* circumstances of freedom of discussion* In
treating the second assumption, that the opinion held imy be true, H ill
points out ihat these truths must not bo held as prejudices, independent
of question or investigation, "Truth, thus held, is but one superstition
the more, accidently clinging to the words which enunciate a truth*
The believer must be taught the grounds fo r his b e lie f, and the arguments
against i t  must be experienced so that he my be that much more capable
of defending what he knows to be right* This state can be attained only
through the free discussion that gives man rational assurance, through
argument, that tils beliefs are true* I f  free discus si on is  absent, the
meaning of the true opinion is  lost, and, as F il l  saysi
The words which convey i t  cease to suggest ideas, or 
suggest only a small part of those they were originally 
employed to communicate* Instead of a vivid conception 
and a living belie f there remain ofcly a few phrases re* 
tained by rote; or, i f  any part, the shell and husk 
only of the meaning is  retained, the fin er essence being 
lost*2
Once again, there is the intimation of a liv ing progress, an 
inevitable progress, necessarily engendered by free discussion and the 
r% ht of tbs individual to agree or disagree with accepted and customary 
beliefs, religious or otherwise* This theory of progress is  tin most 
consistent argument fo r lib erty  of thought and discussion, and is the 
prevalent one throughout the whole chapter* This is  backed by logical
Ib id*, p* p6*
2Ib id ., p* 9%
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and u tilita ria n  principles drawn from hia other works* Specific exanples
may be found in  the following passages. ‘Hue f irs t , illustrates the
logical background*
I t  is  the fashion a t the present tine to disparage 
negative logic -  that which points cut weaknesses 
in  theory or errors in  practice, without establish­
ing positive truths*^
•Hie second illustrates M ill*s u tilita ria n  bent as applies to this
problem
Each of these nodes of thinking derives its  u t ility  
from the deficiencies of the other) but i t  is  in  a 
great measure the opposition of the other that keeps 
each within the lim its of reason and sanity* t&less 
opinions favourable to democracy and to aristocracy, 
to property and to equality, to cooperation and to 
competition, to luxury and to abstinence, to sociality  
and individuality, to liberty and discipline, and a l l  
the other standing antagonisms of practical l ife ,  are 
expressed with equal freedom, and enforced and de­
fended with equal talent and energy, there is  no 
chance of both elements obtaining their duet one 
scale Is sure to go vpt  and the other down**
To these he adds the principle of duty to the State, and the problem of
the lack of perfection of the human mind in its  present position on the
path of progress, and points out that the proper combination of these
elements constitutes the answer in the discovery of the freedom and
progress of the individual*
H ill suras up his argument by presenting the ground on which
freedom of expression and opinion must be based as follows* f irs t , to
Îb ld , ,  p. 101*. 
2Ib id *, p. 10?.
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dftzgr free expression Is  to assume the right of in fa llib ility ; second, 
the suppressed opinions may be p artia lly  true and by being opposed to 
the common opinion my add to tbs fund of truth; third* a true opinion 
must be open to discussion to avoid prejudice and to keep the opinions 
v ita l in the minds of the believers* H ill finishes o ff Hie chapter by- 
repeating the right to invective as outlined in  his artic le  in  the 
Westminister Be view*
the following chapter deals with the lib erty  of the Individual 
sc ting* which is  considered by M ill as one of the major elements of 
well-being* I t  opens with a qualification, *Ifo one pretends that 
actions should be as free as opinions.*1̂  Is  believes that opinions 
held privately or expressed in the press* regardless of how vituper­
ative they my be* are not punishable, but only incur punishment or 
suppression when they induce acts that infringe on the rights of other 
individuals* He adds* too* that i f  a mani
Refrains from molesting others in what concerns them, 
and merely acts according to his own inclinations and 
judgment in  things which concern himself* the same 
reasons which show that opinion should be free* prove 
also that he should be -allowed, without molestation, 
to carry his opinions into practice a t his own cost*?
IHn my pursue Ms opinions freely but he my not enforce them to the
leant degree on others in  Ms society* Hsus lias as much right* according
to M ill* to indulge in  various experiments in  liv ing as ha lias in
holding diverse opinions* so that he my progress morally as well as
1Tbid*, p. H I*.
2hoc.cit*
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in te llectually . The only lim it to any accentxicity consists in  a regard 
fo r the rights of the other individuals in  society* There is  fu ll al­
lowance made, in tnis section, for that which M ill calh spontaneity, 
Which consists in allowing the individual to disagree with customary 
procedures on th© basis of his own Interpretation of experience* He 
says, specifically*
Nobody denies that people should be so taught and trained 
in  youth aa to know and benefit by the ascertained re* 
suits of human experience* But i t  is  the privilege and 
proper condition of a human being, arrived at the s»-
tu rity  of his faculties, to use and interpret experience
in  hie own way* I t  is  for him to find out what part of 
recorded experience is properly applicable to his own 
circumstances and character**-
This last reference to the us® and interpretation of experience implies 
that principle established in the Logic* that man controls the fo r* 
raation of his own character* By his interpretation of what happens to 
himself, by reapplying the interpretations and altering circumstances, 
ha m y grow in  virtue and progress to perfection* The mare conforming 
to custom does not develop a^y of the qualities that are distincitve as 
those of a human being, and thus, rebellion against accepted norms ia  
th® cause of liberty is the sign of individuality* In  the tone of the 
Logic, once again, that man ia the master of his own destiny. M ill 
states, "ha who chooses his plan for himself, employs a il his faculties 
and these qualities he requires and ajoarolses exactly in  proportion as 
the part uf his conduct widen ho determines aecoroixig u> his own judg­
ment and feelings*"2 The choice, therefore, of the way in  which a man
1IM d „  p. 116.
2Ib id ., p. 117.
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w ill conduct his life  ia  an emotional act, which may be strong and 
perilous to his fellow members of society i f  he does not control i t  by 
proper judgement* To be acceptable ia  this thesis, the conduct of the 
individual l ife  must result from a proper balance of desires and Lam 
pulses against beliefs and restraints. In  this balance of tested 
a notions and opinions, lie s  the freedom of individuality which must bs 
defended through continuation or attainment of the liberty  of thought*
• h
expression, and discussion!
thus the mind Its e lf  is  bowed to the yoke! even in  what 
people do fo r pleasure, conformity is the f irs t thing 
thought of* they like  in crowds; they exercise choice 
only among tin g s  commonly donei peculiarity of taste, 
eccentricity of conduct, arc shunned equally with 
e rims si un til by dint of not following their own nature 
they have no nature to follows their human capacities 
are withered and starved! they become incapable of any 
strong wishes or native pleasures, and are generally 
without either opinions or feelings of horns growth, 
or properly their own**
'Shis is  M ill's  condemnation of the mediocrity resultant on loosed be­
lie fs  under the despotism of governmental opinions.
The individuality of human beings must be encouraged by allowing 
them to express themselves in  free acts, "within the lim its imposed by 
the rights and interests of others*"2 As the individuality is  cu lti­
vated, the person becomes more valuable to society by becoming more 
valuable to himself in  progressing to his fu lfillm ent as a well develop­
ed person in  the practical and moral orders. The further he progresses
XIb id „  p. 11?.
2Ib id ., p. 120.
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the freer he becomes. Th® atmosphere of freedom allows genius to ®x» 
pand and results in  the progress and enrichment of human society#
At this point, and in some respects sim ilar to his reconciliation 
of liberty and necessity, fee traditional opposition between Individual 
Liberty and Society is minimized and reduced by showing that the greater 
degree of non-comfonaity to social custom and authority, even to ths 
point of eccentricity, rebounds to the advantage of society# He saysi
In this age, the mere example of non-conf ormity, the 
mere refusal to bend the knee to cue toe, ie  its e lf a 
service. Precisely because the tyranny of opinion is  
such as to make eccentricity a reproach, i t  ia desir­
able, in order to break through that tyranny, that 
people should be eccentric, Eccentricity has always 
abounded when and where strength of character has 
abounded} and the amount of eccentricity in  a society 
has generally been proportional to the amount of 
genius, mental vigour, and moral courage i t  containsd«
That so few now dare to be eccentric marks the chief 
danger of the time#i
This freedom of action is  not lim ited to persons of decided mental su­
periority, i t  is the ligh t of a ll  people to establish the pattern of 
th e ir own individual lives, and the differences between individuals 
requires vast differences in  behaviour. Thus in concluding this 
chapter he declares»
Such a re the differences among human beings in their 
sources of pleasure, their susceptibilities of 
and the operation on them of different physical and 
moral agencies, that unless there is a corresponding 
diversity in their modes of life, they neither obtain 
their fa ir  share of happiness, nor grow up to the
3lb id „  pp. 12L-125.
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mental, moz*al, and aesthetic stature of whicn their 
nature is capable
lib erty , therefore, w ill be possible only ia  the encouragement of
differences, whatever they may be, just so long as they result in a 
marked individuality* Conformity and custom are the enemies of freedom* 
Hence in  this discussion concerning the liberty  of individual 
action, M ill arrives at the following conclusions < the individual ie as 
free to act as he is to think, provided his acts do not infringe upon 
the rights of others -  that is , as long as they are self-regarding actsj 
further, since the only road to truth and virtue is  that of experience, 
or tlie method of t r ia l and error by which false opinions and wrong lines 
of conduct are eliminated, i t  is essential to the intellectual and 
moral progress of tha individual that he be free to perfect himself 
through free ac tiv ity . Thus mediocrity w ill be eliminated by the growth 
and toleration of eccentricity, and society w ill benefit by the 
emergence of strong characters and personalities! conformity and custom 
are not only the enemies of freedom in the individual, they are also 
the enemies of th© growth and perfection of society as a whole*
M ill, having in the previous chapter considered the lib erty  of 
action from th© point of the individual in society, now considers ths 
role of society in lim iting that lib erty . He lays down as a f irs t  
principle that, "Each w ill receive its  proper share. . . .To individuality 
should belong the part of life in  which i t  is chiefly the individual
1Ib id ., p. 125.
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that la interested} to society, tha part which chiefly interacts 
society
It la at this point that Mill makes a raors exact distinction be*
tween the feelings and conduct of non towards one another. If a person's
actions merely displease his fellows, he may not be restricted by law
since he incurs his own penalty in the error of his ways. If, however,
this person infringes on the rules necessary for the protection of the
other members of society, and the consequences of that act fall on other
men, then he must be punished and his liberty restricted!
In the one case, he is an offender at our bar, and we 
are called on not only to sit in judgment on him, but, 
in one shape or another, to execute our own sentence! 
in the other case, it is not our part to inflict any 
suffering on him, except what may incidentally follow 
from our using ths same liberty in the regulation of 
our own affairs, which we allow to him in his.2
When men has reached maturity the society in which he lives can only 
blame Itself if that man acts in any way prejudicial to good order be­
cause in the formative years of the Individual's youth that society has 
had absolute power over him, with ths resultant responsibility of educat­
ing him in such a way as to make him capable of rational conduct in his 
later years. And too, when society does eventually interfere, "the odds 
are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place.>£his inter­
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wrongly so, that the individual ia acting differently from the accepted 
standard*
In the last chapter, entitled Applications* MlH attenpta once 
again to clarify the two maxims that he combines to form his doctrine of 
liberty*
The maxima are, first, that the individual is not 
accountable to society for his action, ia so far 
as these concern the interests of no person but 
himself. Advice, Instruction, persuasion, and 
avoidance by other people if thought necessary by 
them for their own good, as the only measures 
by Which society can Justifiably express its 
dislike or disapprobation of his conduct.
Secondly, that for such actions as are prejudicial 
to the interests of others, the individual is 
accountable, and may be subjected either to social 
or to legal punishment, if society is of opinion 
that the one or the other is requisite for its 
protection,l
Rider these two rules he includes remarks to the effect that society 
can interfere in competition only in oases of fraud, treachery, or 
force, and that trade must be absolutely free* Any preventative function 
allowed to the government is liable to abuse*
The remainder of the essay deals with particularized acts and 
oiroumstames, and the conclusions Mill draws from them are listed*
The first of these states that a violation of good manners in public 
constitutes an offence against others and may rightly be prohibited.
He next points out that the individual is not free to alienate or for­
sake his freedom. The moral responsibility of a man to his wife and
3lMd., pp. Utf-150.
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children is also indicated and, in conjunction with this, the responsi­
bility of ths government in seeing that the children an properly edu* 
eated for the good of society so that the future conclusions they m y  
oaks will be useful to society*
All attempts by ths State to bias the conclusions of its 
oitizens on disputed subjects are evilj but it may very 
properly offer to ascertain and certify that a person 
possesses the knowledge requisite to mahe.his conclusions, 
on any given subject, worth attending to*
In concluding, Hill lists three objections to any government 
interference, even to that interference that does not infringe i$om 
personal liberty. The first of these is that anything done is better 
enacted by an individual who has an interest in the task, Ths second 
argument is that If an act is performed by an individual, he contributes 
to his own mental progress* The last reason for limiting governmental 
interference is that the greatest check possible must be kept on its 
power over individuals. This would indicate that Hill would have the 
governing body act as little as possible in all situations except that 
of protection for its subjects. Finally he expresses his admiration for 
ths American form of government which is composed of a free people who 
are capable of governing themselves without becoming involved in a 
bureaucracy. Its greatest advantage, he says, lies In ths minute division 
of offices and greater extension of the franchise*
Before leaving the essay On Liberty, it will be wall to summa­
rize briefly the basic ideas and principles vpon which the entire
XIbld., p. 162,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
37
treatise is constructed. It seems self-evident to Mill, although he 
rejects self-evident principles as such* that the individual and not 
the state is sovereign! that liberty is man's highest attribute, and its 
only limitation is self-protection. Liberty is the condition of pro­
gress in knowledge and virtue, and the ultimate criterion of goodness 
is utility - utility in its widest meaning based on the permanent in­
terests of man as a progressive being. Since there exists no infallible 
arbiter of truth and virtue, these can be obtained only be experience, 
realized through freedom of thought, speech, and action. The traditional 
enemy of these freedoms has been the assumption by the government that 
it ia the infallible judge, and that it has the right to suppress these 
freedoms whenever it is in its interest to do so. Against this govern­
mental control Kill argues that it defeats its own purpose, promotes 
mediocrity, and prevents human progress. Claiming for the individual, 
therefore, the maximum degree of freedom, he grants the only legiti­
mate limitation which society or government may Impose is that which 
prevents the individual from infringing on the rights of others. Hence 
he concludes with the declaration that*
A State which dwarfs its men, in order that they may 
be more docile Instruments in its hands even for 
beneficial purposes —  will find that with small men 
no great thing can really be accomplished! and that 
the perfection of machinery to which it has sacri­
ficed everything will in the end avail it nothing, 
for want of the vital power which, in order that 
the machine might work more smoothly, it has pre­
ferred to banish.-*-
1IUd., p. 170.
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la  ad&tloa to the foregoing analysis of the oseay Oa liberty*
i t  Is inpcartant now to consider two other major works of 111,
Utilitarianism  and Considerations so Itoniicsentatlvc CSTOrnment* because
of the lntbiste relation which they bear to til® seated doctrine of
lib e rty , which ju s tify  the standard presentst? on of the essentials of
Ids thought as being contained la  thee* worts* This bwsceiee a ll ths
m m  evident when i t  is  recalled that tor him u t ility  is  the criW rion
of vtrtosi sad after establishing on that hosts his doctrine of lib e rty ,
he proceeds to in^tdrs into toe kind of government which w ill best as*
sure the to ll exercise of this sopericr buesn faculty*
The treatise dtlHtarianlgr* wm f ir s t  published ia  Fraser *a
"aaaslns la  l&SL and repubHshed as a bode ia  1863* toe f irs t important
observation to be rwide oancendag this worts is  that i t  is  u t ilita r i*
anian with a difference* He begins his essay with a statement which Is
practically that of his swnfcor Benthaat
The creed which accepts as the toundation of morals,
U tility , or the greatest Happiness Principle, bolds 
that actions are right in  proportion as they tend to 
jsrawte bapjribness, wrong as they tend to pro-toco tbs 
reverse o f happiness* By happiness is  Intended 
pleasure, and the absence of p a in f 'm tatoappixwss, 
pain, and the privation of pleasure**
This statement comprises th® two basic principle® of u tilitarian ism
the greatest Tappinesa IV’nciple, and ths definition of happiness in
terms of pi©a©*ure and pain* Tbeee two swot 'be am®i'.tere<f separately be*
ca'jsa, in  'toe elaboration of Ms doctrine of u t il ity , . I l l  adheres to
s . r.m.B U tllitarlanlssi (bandana icnapiane, ’’rocn -iad Co** 
1077) 6th ed*, pp. ..... 11..1
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the first throughout but substantially modifies the second until it is 
almost foreign to the creed of his predecessors*
The importance of th© Greatest Happiness Principle, in relation 
to the doctrine of liberty, consists in the fact that it is the criterion 
of what is good or evil in human thought and conductf and he consistent­
ly holds that it is the very foundation of morality. Thus he declares*
This, happiness being, according to the utilitarian 
opinion, the end of human action, is necessarily also 
the standard of morality) which nay accordingly be 
defined, the rules and precepts for human conduct, by 
the observance of which an existence such as has been 
described might be, to the greatest extent possible, 
secured to all mankind) and not to them only, but so 
far as the nature of things admits, to the whole 
sentient creation.*
Regarding the second principle, in which he departs from Bentham,
it is sufficient to note a widening of the definition of happiness from
the limited pleasure and pain theory to include the raws humane values
of pleasures qualitatively different, the admission of emotional values,
and the higher intellectual and moral aspirations* This new view may
be seen in the following passage*
Genuine private affections, and a sincere interest in 
the public good, are possible, though in unequal de­
gree, to every rightly brought ip human being. In a 
world in which there is so much to interest, so much 
to enjoy, and so much also to correct and improve, every 
one who has this moderate amount of moral and intel­
lectual requisites is capable of an existence which 
may be called enviable) and unless such a person, 
through bad laws, or subjection to the will of others, 
is denied the liberty to use the sources of happiness
1Ibid.. p. 17*
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within hla ro&eh, ha sdll not fail to find this 
enviable existence**
In the practical application of these principles Mill demands
that society, through education and favourable organisation, faoilitata
for tha individual tha axsroiaa of hla liberty in accordance with thia
higher interpretation of happiness* Thus ha saysi
Man losa thair high aspirations aa they lose their 
intellactuAl tastes, because they hava not tins or 
opportunity for Indulging themj and thay addlat 
themselves to inferior pleasures, not hooauaa thay 
deliberately prefsr them, hut baeauaa thay art 
either tha only ones to which they hava access, or 
tha only ones whioh they are any longar oapahla of 
enjoying*?
To prevent the general degradation of society, the common man mat be
shown tha pleasures of the intellect* Mill's statement would appear to *
Indicate that the ignorance of the people, and thair incapability ia 
choice of acts or pleasures, as before mentioned, are das purely to the 
binding entanglements forced m  to them by tha government or the society 
in which they live* 'Here appears too, in this work, tha problem aa to 
who is to be the final authority in a disputed question, in this casa on
tha plane of choice of pleasures* If there is a doubt as to whioh of
tap pleasures is the best, or which of two modes of life ia the higher, 
tha Judgment must be left to those persons who hava experienced both 
sides of the question* But M U  goes on to add that if there is a
^bld., p. a  
2Ibid., p. 15*
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Ul
disagreement among these people of greater experience then the judg­
ment of the majority must be accepted as the rule* This appeal to the 
democratic principle of the rule by Majority Indicates a definite 
slackening off of his former condemnation of the majority rule, a l-  
though he never completely outgrew his misgivings regarding political 
majority rule#
This Introduction of tha democratic principle deciding so 
fundamental a question as the Interpretation of happiness leads direct* 
ly to the consideration of M s  essay on Bepresentatlve government# In 
the preface to this treatise he admits that it contains nothing new as 
cosgtared with his previous writings. There is novelty# however# in pre- 
sentlng the old ideas in their proper connection# and he further justi­
fies the treatise b/ saying that there is a need of a new political 
doctrine whioh will not be a compromise between Conservatives and 
Liberals but something higher which either party might adopt without 
forsaking what is valuable in their own political creed#
In support of his statement that there is nothing new in this 
essay# it might be profitable to relate it to the fourth chapter of the 
essay on liberty where he discusses society and the individual) the type 
of government which he advocates will be conditioned and determined by a 
all he has said against governmental control and corporate interference 
with the exercise of individual liberty. First, the form of government 
Mill advocates must be popular# and he lays down three conditions under 
this heading!
The people for whom the form of government is intended
must be willing to accept itj or at least not so
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
h2
swilling as to oppose axi iiieturwuntable obstacle to 
Its ostablislwenb* Th®/ rvaet b® willing and able to 
do what Is necessary to keep it standing* And they 
mmt be willing and able to do what it -'f
then to enable it to ftilfil its purposes* Th® word 
’’do" is to b® understood as including forbearances m  
well as sots* Uw/ met be capable of fulfilling 
the oonditAons of aottoxi* and the conditions of self- 
restraint* v lch ar® neoeseary either ffer laeening the 
established polity in existence* or for enabling it 
to achieve th® ends* its eonduoivensss to which ferns 
its receamndatlon**
Xn seeking the criterion of a apod fora of goverrront* UXl discusses
two 'tmlitioo, sewed by Coleridge as Ibrasnenee and lYogreosion*
’•batover <«alltiee* therefore* in a ipvemnont* tend 
to m m m m g m  aot< vity* energy* courage* originality* 
are recudcdtee of Permanence as well as o f mn^p&m$ 
only a somewhat less degree of thm will on the 
average suffice for th© framer purpose than for the 
latter*2
Odag further ia the search for the Ideal for® of government* he vigor­
ously denounces a long-standing traction that the "good despot* consti­
tutes the best fora, and asks*
wtiat should we then have? 0»a nan of eupcrhoma 
wntal activity mm^Lng ths entire affairs of a 
aonte&y passive people* thair passivity is to* 
plied in the very idea of absolute power* %e 
nation as a whole* ond every individual eonpoetng 
it, r>vti without any potential voice in their 
own no will in respect to
their collective Interest* AH le decided fur 
thm by a w ill not their own* :Mch i t  Is legally 
a crlne for then to disobey**
J* S* "liH * THjlltarlanlgri* and Represeqtat.ive lowernraant* p. 177* 
^b id ** p* 186*
3Ibid.. p* ?03*
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It Is not necessary* for tbs purposes of our research, to pursue 
further, in any greater detail, Mill's doctrine of representative 
government. TIm  passages considered suffice to Indicate his thought, 
as expressed here, with his views on liberty and the progress of nan 
through the free exercise of that liberty according to the principle 
of utility. He does, indeed, consider the proper functions of the 
government, its infirmities and dangers, the representation of ainorl* 
ties, the extension of the suffrage, and the modes of its exercise, but 
these are all dominated by a vsry strong and clear concept of a demo­
cratic fora of government, adjusted and adapted to his doctrine of 
individual freedom and progress*
There ie no difficulty In showing that the ideally 
best form of government is that in which the sover­
eignty, or supreme controlling power in the last 
resort, is vested in the entire aggregate of the 
community! every citlsen not only having a Voice In 
the exercise of that ultimate sovereignty, but being, 
at least occasionally, called on to take an actual 
part in the government, by ths personal discharge 
of some public function, local or general.1
There remains now, the question, what did Mill mean by the ten* 
“liberty”? Before determining the answer to this problem, several con­
siderations must be taken into account. In his system of logic Mill 
holds that the first step in any discussion is die definition of the 
terms employedj but also in the logic, he distinguishes between induction 
and “induction improperly so-called.” According to the second kind of 
reasoning,one progresses from particular to particular and not from
^Ibid., p. 207.
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particular to the general law >v principle* la the dcvelopnont of the 
doctrine o f liberty fin Is attempting to apply the esperinental nethod 
of onptrical science to social and mral uestl.one, and in this process 
he nakes the second aethod of induction M s  Item of procedure* '.'ere* 
over, the power to define* in the strictest sense InpUea the power to 
knew definitely* finally* ond Absolutely M  a thing Is* But this* 
according to Hill* amounts to infallibility, and since he cannot dal* 
for hteelf what he denies to all others* the nearest approach to * 
definition possible for M a  is a working hypothesis or descriptive type 
of definition which outlines the conditions of liberty*
Since there is no specif is definition of the tom in M s  work* 
the facet clear and concise answer to the aieetton proposed above nay he 
found in the descriptive ©lenentc that have been expressed throughout 
the works eoneiderodl
a) The individual is sovereign over Ms self •regard; ng thoughts* 
words, m3 ads*
b) The only eondf tion under which society m y  linit those 
freedom is that In which the individual infringes upon the liberties 
of others*
o) The ends of m n  - truth rind virtue - can only be obtained 
thrnigh frecdon of thought* -:E.0en.»rfon, and action* since there is no 
infallible «*t4t»r of *hat is true or false* good or evil) ary attsnpt 
to limit these essential freedom is the assuryitian -■£ in fa llib ility .
The riling principle of the doctrine of liberty is one of Absolute in* 
sulatian in the interest of individual devwlcprieni* -.*aeed on these
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nasdjsa is  the ‘teftnitten of liberty* liberty consist® in the pursuit of 
.ijoost or virtu»t and th* individual is United in Ms pursuit oifly by the 
r*.ght of th* other s»rfo*re of society te a tta in  the ease endf It is the 
condition of progree®, both Individual and sodLatj and i t  i® a re lative  
and advancing principle, differing fron nation to nation taid fron age to 
a®**
7hMM points contain the essential elements of Hll's descriptive 
definition of civil liberty based upon his concept of peychol& £eal 
.freedom* If th® definition m m  reduced still further, ten characteristics 
my be specifically noted* the ©fsaaoration of the basis freedoms of the 
individual, of thought, speech, and action* secondly, th® e>ndaLtions 
rata* vhieh the state m y  Halt these freedoms, not on any abstract 
principle of its c m  authority, but t* safeguard th® liberties of other 
individuals in society* liberty, under these ccmdltlons, is the protect* 
ion of the individual against th© tyranny of every other tedividual in 
society, tfoethsr the offending person be acting singularly or vith the 
majority*
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INFLUENCE AND REACTION
An analysis of the contemporary reactions and criticisms which 
these writings by M ill, and particularly the essay On Liberty, evoked in  
nineteenth century England w ill be helpful toward# a more complete unde**- 
standlnc of M ill*# doctrine* The purpose ia to find further precision# 
of his idea in the light of diat hi# contemporaries understood him to 
say*
The firs t piece of c ritica l material to be considered appear# in  
the American Presbyterian aid Theological Review and is a reprint of an 
artic le  by James M’ Cosh, LL.D., which appeared originally in The British 
and Foreign Evangelical Review of A pril, 1868. This a rtic le , entitled  
M ill*a  Reply to Hi# C ritics, has in  common with most of the c ritic a l 
articles to b© examined that i t  is directed toward M ill’ s theory of 
knowledge and of morality, in  which he denies the existence of necessary 
truth* the special reason for the attack is that these notions are the 
very foundations of his doctrine of lib erty . After expressing his admi­
ration for the dialectic and deductive a b ility  of M ill, M’ Cosh indicates 
a certain defect which he finds in  this author, " It is peculiarly a 
clear and penetrating understanding* but i t  is not distinguished by wide
1*6
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sympath and philosophical comprehensiveness• The author traces this
this facult to M ill’s early education, and says*
I t  is surely conceivable that he may have been so 
fille d  with his own system, inherited from a beloved 
father, and cherished resolutely at the time when 
the tide was a ll against him, and that i t  may now 
bulk so largely before his eyes, as to mate him to 
some extent incapable of appreciating, or even 
thoroughly comprehending, those who look on things 
from a different point of view.2
Observing the privileged position which M ill gives to the role of
memory as an intuition endowed with certitude, the c ritic  expresses
dissatisfaction with M ill’ s handling of association, " It relates to the
power of association to generate new ideas and to produce b e lie f, in
fac t, to take the place of judgment or the comparison of things. I t
is , perhaps, the most fa ta l of a ll the errors in  Mr. M ill's  speculation."3
Proceeding in his criticism of M ill’ s theory of knowledge, he observes hat
M ill has not sufficiently understood or explained what is involved in
sensation*
He never sees what is really involved in  sensation, 
which is never fe lt  except as a sensation of se lf,
But I  have a s t i l l  greater complaint against him 
for never te llin g  us precisely what association 
can do, and what i t  can not do... he makes 
association a source of new ideas. In other words,
James M’Cosh, LL.D., M ill’s Reply to His C ritics, in "The 
American Presbyterian and Theological' Review" (New Yo'iic: J.M. Sherwood, 
1868), XVII, p. 350.
2Ibid . ,  p. 359.
3Ib id ., p. 377.
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he rives to new association a power which the 
a priori philosophers have given to the in­
te lle c t,!
I t  is  interesting to recall the development of M ill’s philosophy which 
led him to the writing of his Logic, Having inherited the eighteenth 
century enthusiasm for progress and enlightenment and a complete compe­
tence in  the efficacy of education in the formation of human character 
and human ideas and conduct, M ill wished to apply to ethics and politics  
and a ll social problems the inductive methods which had proved so 
successful in the fie ld  of physical science. He apparently accepted 
the theory of association of ideasj knowledge becomes for him nothing 
but a firm and coherent association of ideas, and what the a priori 
philosophers called the necessity of truth is simply the firmness and 
s tab ility  of these associations. In fac t, i t  would appear that M ill's  
whole logical theory is  constructed on the basis of laws of association. 
The c ritic , however, objects to this characteristic of M ill's  theory by 
which he gives too much to experience and association, arri too l i t t le  
attention to the role of intellectual judgment. In illustration  of this 
point M'Cosh sayst
This brings us to the ® nsideration of the now 
notorious examples which he adduces of the raost 
certain principles of arithmetic arri geometry 
being unbelievable in other circumstances J that 
2x2 moy be 5) that paralle l lines nay meet j that 
two right lines being produced w ill meet at 
two points j and that two or more bodies may
Loc.cit.
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exist in the same place.3.
In this passage i t  is  to be noted that, what a p rio ri philosophers and 
conceptualiats would ca ll firs t principles and necessary truths, are 
not so regarded by M ill and for the reasons seen above. M'Cosh further 
observes that M ill regarded the examples cited above as, "fitted  to 
lessen our assurance of the certainty of objective truth",^ This 
tendency, according to the c r itic , leads toward the most disastrous 
consequences and renders a ll knowledge subjective and relative} M ill, 
in the words o f’ the author, "strips man of the power of reaching positive 
truth and of pronouncing judgment on the rea lity  of things."3 The 
artic le  concludes by designating M ill as a Nominalist, since he lim its 
himself to a comparative study of terms and ideas to the neglect of the 
base problem of the relation between things and thoughts, wh’ch is of 
primary concern to the conceptualiat in epistomology for whom words are 
signs of thoughts and thoughts are similitudes of things. The author 
declares*
Hr. M m  ia a nominalist, and looks at the name, its  
denotation and connotation, instead of the mental 
exercise} whereas, I  am a conceptualiat (though, 
certainly, not in the sense in  whch many are), and 
have labored to br^ng out the process pf mind involved 
in the notion, judgment and reasoning.h
XIbid. , pp. 379-380. 
2Ib id .. p. 380.
3Ib id . .  p. 381.
j|Ib id ., pp. 383- 381*.
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A later artic le  in the same review, entitled Mr. M ill and Ilia 
Grit lea, and written by Francis Bower, covers practically the same ground 
as the criticism considered above, and attacks H ill ’ s denial of necessary 
truth. This author finds M ill’s treatment of mathematical axioms en­
tire ly  unsatisfactory and quotes him to the effect thati
We should probably have no d iffic u lty  in putting 
together the two ideas supposed to be incompatible, 
i f  our experience had not firs t inseparably associ- 
ated one of' them with the contradictory of the 
other. 1
And he observes that, according to M ill, the only reason why we cannot 
believe that two plus two are five is that we have been uniformly 
accustomed to think that they are four. Bower exclaims, "Surely this 
is empiricism run mad, since .it is more than the stoutest advocate of 
the doctrine, that a l l  our knowledge of real things is derived from ex­
perience, needs to a ffirm .A g a in s t this emplrlcims of M ill, Mr. Bower 
concludes with the following declaration!
The compatibility or incompatibility of two given 
attributes with each other is a universal truth, 
even a necessary and immutable truth , which is 
often grasped quite as firm ly through a single 
intuition, as through a multitude of experiments j 
moat of the primary truths of mathematics are of 
this character.3
The next critical source which must be considered comprises a 
series of three articles which appeared anonymously in the “Dublin Re­
view" in the following secjucnce i the first is entitled Mill on Liberty
Francis Bower, ,\ir. M ill and His C ritics, in "The American 
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which appeared In  1869; the second, Mr. M ill19 Denial of Necessary 
Truth, in the year 1871; and fin a lly , Mr, M ill on the Foundation of 
M orality, written In 1872,
Tb.e f irs t  essay opens with an observation on the d ifficu lty  
with which the c ritic  is faced in discussing M ill's  doctrine of lib ­
erty due to the failure on his part to give a definition Oi what he 
means by liberty*
He leaves his reader at the disadvantage of having 
to pick out and join together the detached pieces 
of a puzzle; to learn the map of liberty as we used 
to learn geography, with this difference, that under 
that system w© knew when the whole map was complete, 
whereas Mr, ^ i l l  furnishes us with no means of such 
assurance,!
In analysing what the author calls the principles on which the doctrine 
rests, he covers the fam iliar ground of the soversignty f  the in­
dividual and the lim itation of compulsion or control to self-protection; 
the denunciation of lim itation of individual freedom of thought, word, 
and action as the assumption of in fa llib ility ; the appeal to u tility  as 
the standard on a ll ethical questions; the empirical approach to truth 
and virtue, which the w riter calls "the old, exploded Pyrrhonism"; and 
asks t
Why did he not begin his essay with the declaration 
that his whole system is a mere guess? that he 
Icnowg nothing of what he is writing about; and that
as uhere must needs be many errors to one truth,
the chances are a thousand to one that he is going
**<111 on Liberty, in "The Dublin Review", X III ,  New Series, 
(London* Hurns,' Oates' anti Co.), pp.63-6U,
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to write absurdities*3'
The central criticism in this a rtic le  is already implied in the state­
ment just quoted, that the lack of certitude, which is the ultimate out­
come of M ill1s theory of knowledge, reduces his own declarations con­
cerning liberty to the level of personal opinions with no justification  
beyond M ill's  own authority. The c ritic  further shows the destructive 
influence of this basic deficiency by placing in  juxtaposition the 
following pair of maxims of which M ill makes so much*
The only purpose for uhlch power can be rightfu lly  
exercised over any member of a civilized common 
against his w ill, is to prevent harm to others.*
The second is*
Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in 
dealing with barbarians, provided the end be 
their improvement, and the means justified by 
actually effect' ng that end. Liberty, as a prin­
ciple, has no application t i l l  men have become
capable of being improved by free and equal dis­
cuss ion. 3
The author then points out that before these declarations can have any 
meaning i t  should be known what is meant by "rightfu lly", despotism", 
and "civilization". The question is raised as to who is to define these 
terms that M ill leaves vague. For example, opinions regarding c iv ilisa­
tion d iffe r) scarcely two men w ill agree on a defintion of the words.
1Tbld«, p. 66.
2Ib id ., P. 70,
3 Ib id ., P. 70.
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Whether a nation has arrived at the point where i t  is car able of im­
provement by free and equal discussion is a ratter of opinion. I t  ia  on 
th is point, the author declares, that the whole controversy turns* The 
only meaning i t  can possibly have is to be found in  the opinion of Mr* 
' ' i l l ,  Hie author demands that M ill define his terras or give up his 
pr'nclple. The criticism becomes more sever® when he finds M ill saying 
that rdnnty-nins raen oat of & hundred are incapable of judging any 
matter not self-evident. And so i t  comes to th is , that ninety-nine men 
out o f a hundred, "mast be slaves to Mr. M ill’s intellectual discipline, 
in. order that they may enjoy a liberty whose sweets they ne ther desire 
new even understand."* Th® artic le  concludes with other examples and 
illustrations of the general aim which th© author claims he had in writ­
ing the artic le , to point out th® inconsistencies with which the essay 
On Liberty abounds* The final judgment voiced by the c ritic  Is that 
they (M ill’s propositions) are*
Sothlng but popular fallacies ore s k illfu lly  stated 
than usual**.there is no profound philosophy in them, 
at least having no claim whatever to be the hundredth 
man,#* .we confess, we have no d ifficu lty  whatever in  
admitting our in ab ility  to understand this fabric 
without basis, this lever with out fulcrum, this pro­
cess from no start! ngj-plac# and towards no goal, t ‘!s  
knowledge begotten of doubt, th is logic without pre­
misses and without condusion, or rather, le t us aay, 
this ocean of hypothetical propositions which yields 
before us and closes behind us, as though the whole 
intellectual l ife  and activ ity  of man were on® in­
fin ite  and sternal If * *
XIb ld *. p. 73* 
2Ib ld *. pp. 72-73.
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The next tiro articles constitute a serims attack on two of the 
major points in  M ill*a doctrine, truth and virtue, fo r which M ill says 
there is no in fa llib le  arbiter or judge and which can be obtained only 
by free experimentation on the basis of u tility *  These ideas are 
essential to his doctrine of liberty*
In the firs t of these articles the author identifies M ill with 
the Fhenomeniat school and declares that M ill is a more satisfactory 
representative of this school than any other for purposes of controversy 
because there is no other, "who has carried out philosophical principles 
into nearly so large a fie ld  of practical application".* The corner­
stone of M ill*s system, this w riter declares, is "his denial that there 
is any truth cognizable by man as necessary."2 lienee he proceeds to 
say that i f  M ill were to admit that tie  re can be found one truth that is 
recognized as necessary his philosophy as a whole would be shattered*
The artic le goes on to establish the argument that mathematical truths 
are cognizable to man as necessary* I t  is  further pointed out that a 
necessary proposition or truth is one, the contradictory of which is an 
in trinsic impossibility and could not be found in  any possible region 
of existence. These truths must be such as can be called significant* 
that is , that th© predicate declares something that is not contained in 
the subject. Further, they ere such that by simply considering the ideas
lnThe Dublin Review", X 7 II, p. 286.
2Ibid . t p. 207.
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of the subject and predicate one comes to see that there really exists 
between them that relate on which the proposition declares. For example, 
the whole is greater than any one of its  parts, is a self-evident and 
necessary proposition because, as soon as one understands what a whole 
is and what a part is , one sees th© truth which the proposition declares 
and which is therefore self-evident and necessary. However, M m  w ill 
not admit that th is is a self-evident and necessary truth but a general­
isation based on experience, this applies with equal force to a ll  
mathematical axioms.
The author then shifts to a criticism of b i l l ’ s psychological 
theory, "which alleges that man*s belie f in necessary truth does not 
authenticate aqy corresponding re a lity , but results from past uni­
formity in  the association of i d e a s . ’This "association", according 
to M ill, has become so established in  the mind that there appears to be 
an a p rio ri connection between the ideas. The c ritic  next points out 
that the constant experience of two ideas in relation to one another
causes one to believe "that in every possible region of existence
2phenomena succeed each other by uniform laws." He then indicates that 
in the logic M ill states that in some other firmament outside of that 
one experienced events may "succeed each other without fixed laws."^ 
Therefore, the experience which contributes to the consistent association 
of certain ideas makes i t  impossible to imagine these experienced
1Ib id . ,  p. 289.
2Jbid., p. 290.
^ loc.cit.
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successions taking place in any other manner#
Later in the artic le the two principles of M ill’ s doctrine -with
which his critic  is taking issue are summed up as follows*
The f irs t  is , that men never account any proposition 
self-evidently necessary, except one which they have 
repeatedly for an indefinite period observed by ex- 
perienoe to be true# The second allegation is , tFat 
whenever two phenomenal facts are undeviastingly and 
unmistakably experiences in  union, a thinker almost 
inevitably is deluded into the fancy, that there is  
some necessary connection between them#*
The firs t of these he dismisses by illustrating  that a person who has 
never experienced a certain proposition before w ill immediately recog­
nize i t  a® self-evident when the facts are put before him. He also 
denies the second of M ill’s statements and illustrates his denial with 
everyday experiences, extending them to other and unexpected possibil­
itie s , ending with the statement*
That which I  have never experienced, I  regard as 
necessary} that wh3.ch 'I  have habitually and un- 
cxceptionally experienced, 1 regard'"as contingent. 
losuceHaxmy therefore mere constant and unif arm 
experience cannot possibly account -  as Mr# M ill 
thinks it  does -  for the mind*® connection of 
self-evident necessity*2
Towards the end of the essay is found the definition of the Phenomenistic
doctrine to which M ill was identified in the opening rages*
The phenomenistic doctrine is such as this* that an 
ascertained truth, means a truth experiened or in­
ferred from experiene ej that he who lays stress on 
supposed intuitions, leaves a foundation of lock to 
build on the said} that such a thinker, instead of
1Ibid« # p. 297. 
2Ib id ., p. 299*
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manfully and philosophically confronting facts, 
erects into a would-be oracle his own individual 
idiosyncracyj that "a p rio ri philosophy" means 
simply the enthronement of prejudice and the 
rejection of experience.
The firs t refutation of this doctrine, the c ritic  claims, in­
volves an examination of tie role of memory in experience, and here he 
finds that M ill contradicts himself fo r, writing on the philosophy of 
Hamilton, M ill said, "Our b elie f in  the veracity of memory is evidently 
ultimate: no reason can.be given far i t ,  which does not presuppose the 
b elie f and assume i t  to be well grounded."^ Here M ill frankly confesses 
that when we trust our memory we believe ourselves to have experienced 
what our memory distinctly tes tifies  -  we are resting exclusively on an 
intuition? we are holding raost firm ly a truth for which experience gives 
us no warrant at a ll. Thus, the c ritic  concludes:
Unless I  hold this in tu itive truth I  am lite ra lly  in ­
capable of receiving any experience whatever? I  have 
no knowledge of any kind, except ray present con­
sciousness. The whole fabric of experience then has, 
for its  exclusive foundation, a series of those in­
tuitions wfaich are called acts of memory. I f  intuitions 
as such are to be distrusted experience is an im­
possibility and its  veiy notion an absurdity.3
Here M ill has made an extraordinary exception to the general doctrine of
the Phenomenistsj no other member of that school would make a statement
1Ib ld ., p. 309.
2
John Stuart M ill, An Examination of S ir William Hamilton’ s 
Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt' and ^o.» iEBIj), I , ' p. 2l6n.
3"The Dublin Review," XVII, p. 309.
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such as that quoted above♦ The c ritic , therefore, interprets i t  as,
"Bo reason can be given for the veracity of memory which does rot pre­
suppose the very thesis far which i t  is adduced."'*’ The author believes 
that he has found an admission on M ill's  part that there is a necessaiy 
or a priori tru th , the veracity of memory. I f  he admits this one, the 
author eannot see why he refuses to admit the intuition implied in a ll 
physical science and which is indeed the fundamental truth  which science 
requires for its  existence, that nature obeys uniform laws. This would 
provide or establish a certain objectivity, necessity, and permanence 
to scientific truth* but i t  is precisely what M ill refuses to accept 
and argues that there may be, on some other planet in the universe, a 
different set of laws according to which natural phenomena take place, 
"In other words", the author says, that doctrine of phenominism, which 
in  some sense idolizes physical science, is in  real truth fa ta l to the 
object of its  i d o l a t r y . i t  is his contention that the affirmations 
of physical science have no va lid ity , except for the immediate present, 
unless one grants the stab ility  of essences and the uniformity of natur­
a l ac tiv ities , and, therefore, of natural laws as the basis of scienti­
fic  knowledge as i t  may be applied to the future. The ultimate basis 
for th is objectivity and necessity of the laws of nature is to be 
found in th® doctrine of an in te llig m t, free, personal God, Who created 
th© world and implanted in nature this permanent way of operating.
When, therefor©, he claims that M ill rejects the permanent and uniform
1Ib id . , p. 309n.
2"The Dublin Revie ■*», XVII, p. 317.
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character of nature, the c ritic  charges that this results from his dis­
belie f in a personal God and calls him an anti-Theist. He says, ’’We con* 
tend that this phenomenistic doctrine is cues legitimately in  pronounced 
a n ti-th e is m ,T h is  charge suggests- that In  the c r itic ’s mind the 
ultimate basis of objective and necessary truth is to be found in the 
veracity of God, and since M ill is anti-Theistie he has no real basis 
for any objective and necessaiy truth} and therefore. M ill cannot 
legitim ately propound a doctrine of liberty  which should be based on 
objective ami necessary norms or principles*
Before attempting to pass judgment on the c ritic a l a rtic le  just 
examined i t  w ill be more economical to reserve that judgment u n til after 
the examination of the second artic le  ty the same author in  another 
issue of the review entitled Mr, M ill on the Foundations of Morality,
This decision is based on what w ill appear to be a very close parallel 
and relationship between the defects attacked and the solution offered, 
by the c ritic , on the problem of knowledge and the problem of morality. 
With the declaration that there exists no in fa llib le  arbiter 
of truth and fa ls ity , thereby denying the existence of any ual?-evident, 
necessary and objective norms of truth, there is the companion declara­
tion that there are no self-evident and necessary moral axioms with re­
gard to good and evil*
Mr. M ill admits of course tha t  moral judgment a are very 
frequently elic ited j but, denying the existence of any 
necessary truths, he denies inclusively that there are
XIb id ,, p, 309,
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moral truths 3clf-evidently necessary* the ground 
whidh h© often seesai to take Is* that no moral 
judgments are intuitions* but th tt a ll are infer­
ences j  though these In f trances* he would add* are 
so readily and imperceptibly drawn, as to be most 
naturally and almost Inevitably mistaken for 
intuitions*!
By way of analysing this position of M ill, the w riter sets down as a 
simple and primary notion in a l l  morality the notion of moral good­
ness* and declares that for M ill "morally good** as applied to human 
acts* means neither more nor less than "conducive to general enjoyment*. 
Listing a series of sample statements* which he says involve the idea 
of moral goodness in  various spheres* the author concludes that even 
M ill would not accept the equation, morally good equals '.hat which is  
conducive to  general happiness* in  those praetial applications. I t  is 
then th© aim* in, this c ritic a l a rtic le , to shew that there are in ­
tu itiv e  moral judgments* universal and necessary* called the f irs t prin­
ciples of morality* and how these are obtained* The c ritic  claim  that 
In  th® f irs t  Instance he Intuits^ as a sclf-ovi out and necessary truth* 
that his betrayal of a friend*® confidence, for example, Is in trinsically  
e v il and, in a second step, lie intu its as self-evidently necessary that 
a ll such betrayals in Ilk© circumstances arc likewise In trinsically  
ev il* Pointing out that this recognition of ev il is  parallel to the 
intuition of the veracity of memory, which cannot be proven or demon­
strated! the author el*h«s that M ill must ad .lt i t  as a fin a l* and 
necessary, moral principle. Having used this merely as an illustra tion ,
^Th® Dublin Review", m i l ,  p. 1;0,
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he argues that there are many such necessary and self-evident principles 
which could be summed up under the universal principle, pood is to be 
done and evil avoided. He concludes that there are stronger grounds 
for accepting the distinct declarations of the moral faculty, or con­
science, than th© distinct declaration of memory#
Again, following th© pattern found in the previous artic le  re­
viewed, he introduces the doctrine of a divine sanction as the necessary 
concomitant of conscience and declares that while the notion, "morally 
e v il* does not include in  i t ,  "prohibited by 5 ome personal being", s t i l l ,  
in fac t, the two are related! and he says that conscience always in­
volves the recognition of a liv ing object towards which i t  is directed, 
One to IShom we are responsible. There is no other way, he claims, to 
account for the remorse, self-condemnation, and misery which results 
from the commission of an evil deed in secret, except the spontaneous 
intutive recognition on the part of man of the existence of a supreme 
law-giver and judge to whom he is responsible. This doctrine gives 
meaning to the statement that there can b® no stable, permanent, ob­
jective cod© of morality without the recognition of God as its  origin 
and sanction.
To sum up, perhpao the best way to state the controversy and the 
disagreement herein indicated, between M ill and his c ritic  on the found­
ation of morality ie their disagreement on what is meant by morally good 
and morally e v il. M ill declares that morally good means that which is 
conducive to general happiness, and morally ev il that which is adverse 
to the promotion of general enjoyment. He further holds that in the 
application of this in particular cases there are not objective moral 
axioms or principles in  the light of which moral rood 3 nd evil may be
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judgedj H ill would base -.’.oral judgements on general conclusions drawn 
from the experiences of l ife . But the c ritic  objects to tide social 
standard of what i t  generally useful oar beneficial, and bases hie 
morality on tail vernal and necessary moral axioms, in tu itively known 
by reason and in tu itively  related to a Supreme being as their ultimate 
source and sanction# The c r itic  seeks to score a victory over M ill by 
discovering adnor internal inoonslsteaoiee in the elaboration of the 
doctrine, which constitutes the very foundation of hie doctrine of 
liberty* The c ritic  intimates that the denial by M ill of any universal 
and necessary moral law, and of th® recognition of a law-giv er and,
Judge in questions of moral good and e v il, would cause hie doctrine of 
lib erty  to degenerate into license in which there would b e no possible 
control o v e rt!* self-regarding acts of the individual, whan they did 
not produce personal moral improveeaent#
The ultimate issue between M ill and this c ritic  can be identified  
as th e ir disagreement on the theory of knowledge# for the c r itic , miaan 
knowledge, although dependant on experience fo r its  content, acquires a 
value of certitude aid truth throw# th® organization of the data of 
experience and its  interpretation in the light of imsBitabl®, self-evident, 
and primary principles bath in the speculative and practical order# 
Through this means the theory issues in  the establishment of the object­
iv ity  of knowledge* what is txue, according to th is method, is universal­
ly  true, not just for one man but for a ll men, not only for or® ago but 
for a ll time# For M ill, on the contrary, starting from the experience 
of th® individual, th® best that can be obtained is a sort of personal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
63
tru th , ■which has value for h is  Individual} and i t  possesses only a 
tentative character depending upon the present circumstances which, 
i f  changed, would change the conclusion#
In an attempt to estimate the character of the criticism #' ich 
has just been analyzed, it  would seem that the two groupd of artic les, 
those appearing in the American Presbyterian and Theological Review 
and in  the Dublin Review, attack M ill from a backgromd of the recog­
nition of firs t principles, self-evident axioms, and objective truths 
which are regarded as necessary forth© s tab ility  and va lid ity  of his 
doctrine of liberty* From their religious preoccupations they 
sim ilarly maintain the existence of necessary truths bearing divine 
sanction and which serve as f irs t  principles In the order of truth  
and morality as r  presented by creeds and commandments# The whole of 
th e ir argumentation, founded on this starting point, aims to prove Lk*# 
M ill illo g ic a l, inconsistent, inconclusive and erroneous} and, in vari­
ous ways, they designate him as an Empiricist, a nominalist, and a 
Positivist, incapable of formulating an accurate and permanent doctrine 
of liberty*
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CONTEMPORARY EVALUATION
In 1373, the year of M ill’s death, two books appeared -which 
attempt to evaluate his contributions to the cause of freedom j the 
f ir s t  work treats directly with the doctrine of lib erty , and the second 
is a tribute to his attainments in  the p o litica l realm.
The f irs t  work: to be examined is a book by James Fitzjames 
Stephen, Q.C., entitled Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, the American 
edition of which appeared in 1873. The section on Liberty is  specific­
a lly  concerned with the doctrine as exposed by M ill, After linking the 
general doctrine of lib erty , equality, and. fraternity with various 
p o litic a l and religious forms whidh have made I t  their business to pro­
mote these ideals, Stephen characterises the doctrine as the religion of 
humanity and as being possibly the best name that can be found for it *
He then points out*
No better statement of the popular view -  I  mi-*it, 
perhaps, say of the religious dogma of liberty  -  
is to be found than that which is  contained in Mr*
M ill’ s essay on the subject. His works on 
Utilitarianism  and the Subjection of Women afford 
excellent illustrations of the forms of the doc­
trines of equality and fratern ity  to which I  object,1
Ĵames Fitsjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity 
(New Yorki Holt and filliam s, 1873), p» u.
Ox
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Indicating his dissent from the widespread and in fluentia l opinions re­
garding this democratic ideal, he saya that M ill’ s exposition On Liberty 
is the ablest, most reasonable, and clearest* He then proceeds to a 
summary of the introductory chapter which he claims is the most Import­
ant part of the -work, restating the claims ttiich M ill makes for thought, 
speech, act, and the limitations he places about government and society 
in attempting to restrain or control those freedoms, and the extension
of this liberty of the individual to combinations of individuals* Such
being the doctrine, Stephen observes with wonder, that Mr, M ill never 
attempts to prove i t  as a whole. After a b rief suiaaary of the rest of 
the contents of the essay, chapter by chapter, he say?*
There is hardly anything in the whole essay which can
properly be called proof as distinguished from enunci­
ation or assertion of the general principles quoted,
I  think, however, that i t  s i l l  not be d ifficu lt to 
show that the principle stands in much need of proof*
Beginning, then, with the word1 "liberty", and claiming to interpret i t
according to the principles which he holds in common with f i l l ,  he
develops its  meaning as follows*
A ll voluntary act® are caused by motives. A ll motives 
may be placed in one of two categories -  hope and fear, 
pleasure and pain* Voluntary acts of which hope is the 
motive are said to be free . Voluntary acts of which fear 
is the motive are said to be done under compulsion, or 
omitted under restrain t*.*
I f  this is  the true theory of liberty  -  and, though 
many persons would deny th is , I  do not think hr. M ill 
i7o-old -  the propositions already stated w ill in  a con­
densed form amount to this* "No one is every justified
Ib id ., pp. 8-5?.
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In  trying to affect anyone*8 conduct by exciting 
hie fears, except for the sake of self-protection1*} 
or, making another substitution, which he would 
also approve -  " It  can never promote the general 
happiness of mankind that the conduct of any persona 
should be affected by an appeal to their fears, ex­
cept in the cases excepted*"*
Such assertions, this author observes, can not be regarded as self-evident
and hence they stand in  reed of proof* Indeed, be finds the® opposed to
a ll morality, existing religions, and criminal legislations insofar as
they aim at affecting h- man conduct in  that they appeal either to  hope
or fear, and to fear more commonly and more emphatically than to hops*
Thus, he adds*
For on® act from which on® person is restrained by the 
fear of the law of the land, many persons are restrained 
fro® iraiuasrable acts by the fear of the disapprobation 
of th eir neighbours, which is the moral sanction} or by 
the fear of the punishment in a future state of existence, 
which ie the religious sanction} or by -tee fear of their 
cam disapprobation, which may be called tbs conscientious 
sanction, and may be regarded as a compound case of the 
other two*2
The author proceeds to assert that neither tbs moral sanction nor the 
rclirious sanction have anything to do whatever with self-protect ion, 
yet M ill intimates that the moral sanction is essentially immoral and 
mischievous, and though ho does not draw this in f ©pence, the author 
says.it is involved in th© theory, that a day of general Judgment is 
fundamentally immoral* He conclude® Ms reasoning with this statement,
"A Ood who punished anyone at a ll,  except for the purpose of protecting
1Ib id ., pp. >10*
Ib id *, | >* 10*
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others, would, upon his principles, he a tyrant trampling upon liberty .
He sums up M ill’s moral principles as follows*
"Let every man please himself without hurting his 
neighbour"} and every moral system which aimed at 
mere than th is , either to obtain benefits for 
society at large other than protection against 
injury or to do good to the persons affected, would 
be wrong in principle. This would condemn every 
existing system of morals.2
I t  is clear, from these passages, that Stephen finds the moral theory of 
M ill so much at variance with existing morality which, he says, in a ll 
its  form in a prohibitive system reaching far beyond the lim its indicat­
ed in  his notion of s alf-^protectionj that i t  stands defin itely in  need 
of proof.
Mr. Stephen not only finds M ill’ s definition opposed to a ll
existing systems of morality but opposed to the historical conditions of
a ll great revolutionary movements, and he gives as illu stra tion  the
Reformation and the French Revolution*
They were brought about by force, and in many instances
by the force of a minority numerically small, applied
to the conduct of an ignorant or very partia lly  in­
formed and for the most part indifferent majority.’
Stephen adds that M ill would be the last person to say that force was not
justifiab le in  these cases? and yet i t  cannot be justified  on the grounds
of self-protection alone.
The criticism of Stephen might be summed up in the following 
manner* as a sympathetic admirer of M ill he agrees with much of the
1Ib id ., p. 11 
^Loc.cit.
3Ibid . ,  p. 20.
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doctrine of liberty  in principle. Contrary to then e ’.#10 claim M ill did 
not define liberty, he finds and rewords the definition. But his c ritic ­
ism is directed against the failure on Mill*® part to establish, by 
proof, what he lays down as principle, ĥe second objection is that of 
inconsistency, for not only are facts and experience opposed to the new 
morality, but his exposition of i t  abounds in  exceptions and qualific­
ations which Stephen would gladly have exchanged far proofs* To 
illu s tra te  taro inconsistencies pointed out by Stephen, reference may be 
made b rie fly  to the discussion regarding savage peoples, w ere M ill 
admits of despotism, and the undetermined question as to who is to de­
cide when these people become capable of lib erty . For Stephen says,
"The wildest savages, and the most immature youths, capable of any sort 
of education, are capable of being improved by free discussion upon a 
great variety of subjects,"^ and intimates that there is a necessity 
fo rth®  freedoms M ill advocates even in  the most primitive society, i f  
that society is to progress according to the method laid down by M ill.
A second illustration  is to the effect that Parliamentary Government is 
simply a mild and disguised form of compulsion*
We agree to try  strength by counting heads instead of 
breaking heads, but the principle is excactly the same...
The minority gives way not because i t  is convinced that 
i t  is wrong, but because i t  is convinced that i t  is a
minority,2
Before leaving Stephen, his position on the question of liberty  
may be b rie fly  stated* he agrees with M ill that man should enjoy lib  arty
XXbid.. p. 25.
^ Ib ld ., pp. 27-28.
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of thought, speech, and actionj but that the power of society, in  what­
ever form, must be enlarged beyond the principle of self protection, on 
the basis of the principle of the democratic rule by the majority j and in 
the name of human moral vines which are independent of th e ir discovery 
by individual, and independently and objectively true in every case*
I t  has been observed that lib erty , like anything else, may be 
considered in the abstract or in  the concrete, theoretically or practic­
ally* Applying this principle to M ill * a doctrine of lib erty , i t  must be 
conceded that, in the light of the c ritic a l material which has been ex­
amined , as a theory i t  has been subject to adverse criticism  ranging 
from the most severe strictures to mild, but sympathetic, objections* 
When, however, the practical order is considered i t  may be found that 
M ill*s doctrines have attained some success* Strangely enouiji, die 
opinion has often been expressed that, as a practical politic ian , M ill 
was a failure and that he stands as an illustration  of the notion that 
a philosopher is out of place in practical politics*
In a series of essays written as a tribute to M ill after his 
death, and published in 1673, M illie  ea-ft Garrett Fawcett opposes this 
last view and traces the idea of his fa ilu re  to those who were out of 
sympathy with his social reforms*
I f  to be unpopular because he promoted the practical success 
of the opinions his l ife  had been spent in advocating is 
to have fa iled , then Mr* M ill failed* I f ,  however, the 
success of a politician is  to be measured by the degree in  
which he is able personally to influence the course of 
politics, and attach to himself a school of p o litica l
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thought, then Mr. M ill, in the best meaning of the 
words, has succeeded.^
Mrs. Fawcett here points out that he attached to himself a school of 
p o litic a l thought whereby she means the school of Philosophic Radicals 
who, through the Westminster Review and the U tilita rian  Society, exer­
cised .treat influence with the "Shiga, and, as they were later known, 
the Liberals, as to prompt them tot
Undertake the removal of abuses and the abolition 
of restrictions. It was they who inspired electoral 
refora (1832), the first State grant for education 
(1833), the hew Poor law (l33ir), and the Municipal 
Corporations Act (l835>). They co-operated with the 
Evangelicals in the abolition of slavery in 1833, 
because they loved freedom, but opposed the Factory 
Act of 1833, because they believed in Laissez Fairo.̂
Outstanding among his practi cal achievements was the extension of the
suffrage to women as the logical consequences of his doctrine of liberty.
Regarding this achievement, Mrs. Fawcett observes*
Like a ll genuine p o litical movements, i t  has borne fru it 
in many measures which are intended to remove the 
grievances of 7/hich thoae who advocate the movement conn 
plainj among these collateral results of the agitation 
for women’s suffrage, may be enumerated the Married 
Women's Property Act, the Custody of Infants B ill, and 
the admission of women to the municipal and educational
^rillicent Garrett Fawcett, Ilia Influence as a Practical Poll* 
tic ian , in "John Stuart Mill, His Mi's and WorfeoT' 1Twelve Sketches^1'1 
'(Sostont James 1. Osgood and Co., 1873), p. 8lu
9
'■ ".lo 'oe rt S. .tower, John Stuart Mill, in “Social and Political 
Ideas of the Age of Reae t .t on an d Sec one kr1 ’ ction,n ed. F, J. C. 
Hearnshaw (Hew fork* Barnes and M obie , In c ., 19h9), p. 123.
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franchises and to seats upon schoolboards.l
Perhaps the gre atest achievement tfd ch can be attributed to the
Philosophic Radicals, but more particularly to M ill who was th e ir im-
spirer and leader, was in connection with the Durham Report. In  January
of 1838, M ill began his series of articles in support of Lord IAirham,
who was involved in  what was known as the "Canadian Problem*. He hit*.
self la ter assessed these articles and their effect, when he relates 1
Lord Durham was b itte rly  attacked from a ll sides, inveighed 
against by enemies, given up by timid friend a j while those 
who would have w illing ly defended him did not know what he 
say* He appeared to be returning a defeated and discred­
ited nan. 2
M ill goes on to relate how he had studied the events in Canada from their
inception, and that he had been encouraging his party to carry on with
their adopted policy. He wrote an a rtic le  in the Westminster Review, in
which he praised iXirham and his accomplishment, and immediately other
writers copied his tone. Soon the "Durham Report" was considered as the
model for Canadian and general Colonial policy. And, as M ill says*
The cause was gained* Lord Durham’s report, written by 
Charles Buller, partly under the inspiration of Wake­
fie ld , began a new eraj its  recommendations, extending 
to complete internal self-government, ware in fu ll  
operation in Canada within two or three years, and have 
been since extended to nearly a ll  the other colonies, 
of European race, which have any claim to character of 
important coiamunities.3
■Hfilllcent Garrett Fawcett, op.ctt. ,  p. 85
2
John Stuart M ill, Autobiography, p. 151.
3Ib id .. pp. 151-152.
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M ill’s own assessment of his role in this matter is confirmed by the
following statement by a c ritic  who was otherwise rather severe with
M ill but, in this matter, is his admirer*
One of the greatest things the Philosophical Radicals 
did was in the sphere of Colonial reform* They were 
virtually  the authors of the new policy of self- 
government which saved tie Empire* lord Durham, Charles 
Duller, and Sir William Molesworth in Parliament,
E, 0, Wakefield and J. S* M ill outside, a ll laboured 
earnestly for the new policy, and they succeeded*
Durham's report oil Canada, written mainly by Duller 
and Wakefield, who had been to Canada with him, was 
warmly supported by M ill in the London Review, and 
this prompt action contributed materially to its  
success*1
The criticism of Mi l l 's  doctrine by Stephen is much milder and 
more sympathetic than the c ritic a l material that appeared in the periodic­
a l material reviewed in the previous chapter* But he too finds M ill 
fa ilin g  to establish his doctrine by sufficient or adequate proof, and 
also finds the presentation weakened by the presence of unresolved in ­
consistencies* The criticism in the practical order, however, has been 
chiefly favourable and laudatory, 'Vhatever may be the defects in MiH«s 
presentation of his doctrien i t  is certain that i t  enjoyed a measure of 
success in the fie ld  of practical po litics. From what has been seen, i t  
is obvious that Utilitarianism , as interpreted and expounded by M ill, 
was the underlying Philosophy from which emerged the manifold reforms in  
nineteenth century po lic ia l and social l if e .  I t  may have been a case of 
where the logical or philosophical defects of a popular leader were more 
than overbalanced by his unquestioned sincerity, his personal influence,
"Sower, John Stuart M ill* p, 12li.
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a ll his critics, even the most vigorous, have fe lt  obliged to bear 
witness*
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CONCLUSION
In considering the doctrine of liberty  that was proposed by- 
John Stuart M ill, i t  was found that a study of his education and back­
ground gave souse insight into the for nation of the concept that he pre­
sented in his writings. He received m intense education, under the 
tutelage of his father, that was primarily in the tradition of Jerengr 
Bentham’ s Utilitarianism , with emphasis on the works of Hobbes, Ricardo, 
and Malthus. An Important influence on his considerations of lib erty , 
in  his early years, was his two visits to France} the f irs t  introduced 
him to the French language, the politics of the country, such writers 
as Voltaire and his contemporaries, and the companionship of Baptiste 
Say and the Saint-Simon group} the second gave him an insight into the 
French Revolution and its  alms of lib erty , equality, and fra tern ity .
His early thought was expressed, as a member of the Philosophic 
Radicals, through the Westminster Review. He came to the point, how­
ever, when lie was forced to questioh the principles he had received 
from his father, and through the influence of Continental thought he 
changed his views radically* M ill’ s new Utilitarianism  admitted of 
emotions, and degrees or qualities of pleasure} and he reacted in the 
direction of Socialism under the influence of the works of Wordsworth, 
Coleridge, Goethe, and. Carlyls. Thus his views on democracy and liberal­
ism were greatly affected by the Continental ideas of Ms day.
73
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A study of the doctrine of lib erty , as its  appears in M ill’s 
writings, produced the following results* M ill claimed that there is no 
in fa llib le  authority that has the right to rule in disagreements of 
opinion, that to silence any opinion regardless of its  nature is  an 
assumption of in fa llib ility . There are, then, only two positions in  
the state of liberty* absolute freedom of discussion or despotism.
This right of free discussion is protected from government interference 
by public opinion. Through discussion of this type, man approaches 
certainty by the comparison of opposite opinions? and the certainty 
that continues to withstand opposition is called truth. False opinions 
must be tolerated for the sake of tru th , ard usuallj the opposing 
opinions share the truth between them? if  an opinion is false, its  
in u tility  to man w ill cause i t  to disappear whereas the true opinion 
arises to certainty by withstandrg its  opposite over a period of time. 
Man has the right to hold diverse opinions only in so far as he does 
not attempt to impose them on others? the individual has an absolute 
right to his own opinion, r i ght or wrong.
In the realm of action,man is free to act as long as he does 
not interfere with the rights of the other meubers of society. lie 
should be allowed to establish the pattern of Ms own life  in order to 
attain  virtue? and the greater his eccentricity in  the lirh t of accepted 
norms, the better it  is  for the individual concerned and for the society 
in which he lives. In ethical questions, the ultimate appeal is to the 
standard of u t ility , sine© there is no necessary and objective norm of 
morality. Liberty therefore, in M ill’s estimation, is the protection of
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the individual against the tyranny of every other individual in society 
In  the realm a£ thoughts, words, and acts*
The course of action taken by those contemporary writers who 
would oppose M ill’s doctrine in tbs periodical publications, was to 
attack the basis of his whole system, the epistemology and the logical 
process* The major criticism of M m 's philosophy, that is repeated by 
a ll of the writers considered in this work, is that he denies the ess*
1st erne of objective and necessary tru th  and holds that certitude exists 
in  the firm and coherent association of ideas which are dependent on the 
memory that performs the operation of association* Too, the critics  
point out that M ill w ill not admit of self-evident and permanent moral 
axioms outside of the standard of u tility *  The c ritics , in opposition, 
hold that knowledge is dependent on experience for content, and that i t  
is than interpreted in the light of immutable, self-evident truths in 
the speculative and practical orders, Issuing in an objective aid un­
changing knowledge. And thgy base their code of morality upon the exis­
tence of necessary truths bearing divine sanction and represented by 
creeds and caramanrimente* In comparing these theories of knowledge and 
morality, the critics hold that M ill's  own theory reduces his declarat­
ion to mere opinions which are only valid for their author.
The works of evaluation of i i i l l 'a  contributions in both the 
intellectual and practical orders are somewhat lauditory In tone.
James Stephen calls M ill's  doctrine of freedom an expression of the 
religion of lib erty , and he praises i t  as able, reasonable, and clear, 
lie objects, however, that the essay lacks proof throughout and fa ils  to
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establish any of the principles that <*ill proposes. Stephan finds many 
inconsistencies In the doctrine, but he does find and reword a definition 
which he claims is the prohibition of the exorcise of foar over the 
individual to affect a chansa in hi® actions, except for the sake of self­
protection* He concludes by observing that the power of society over 
the Individual must be enlarged beyond the principle of self-protection. 
Mrs, Fawcett merely deal® with the applications of Hill’s principles 
in the governmental changes he helped to bring about, and finds that he 
was successful in affecting a number of reforms in relation to individual 
and social freedoms.
Mill’s denial of objective truth and morality res lied in the
asetraptlon that every man is a law unto himself, and that his liberty is
absolute. This error appears to be the result of the confusion on
Mill* s art of the end of man, and the role of society in aiding man to
attain that end. The first step, then, in attempting to correct that
error, Is to do what Mill failed to do —  define liberty. Liberty, in
its proper interpretation, isi
The privilege of creatures endowed with mini or reason) 
it is essentially the faculty of being able to choose 
between the mean® conducing to th© end, for he who has 
the faculty of choosing one thing among mary is master 
of his actions, Use possibility of choosing evil is not 
of the essence of liberty, it is a defect peculiar to 
our liberty.1
^Jacques Mari tain, The Things That Are Not Caesar’s, trans. by 
J.F, Scarlan (Hew forks CMHes'T^fener's' Sons, i?3l), r, '-3̂«
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And since man is imperfect and nay choose wrongly, his liberty must be
guarded by society* Iran's end is supernatural happiness which, in  turn,
is perfect llb s ity ; and in  order 'to attain hi® end nan is subject to the
law® of God, to . the authority of the Church in the spiritual realm, and
to the authority of the State on the temporal leve l. This authority la
the help that nan needs, that is capable of direction hia acts away fro *
e v il and towards good* SBL11 allowed for no authority capable of do-
tomdnining what is good and what i® e v il, and he refused to accept any
objective, insautabl© rsoral principle*
Since S ill did not accept the principle of objective truth or
morality, lie held that ntan m at experiment to progress; and that the
State was Infringing on the individual1® freedom by making laws that
controlled what ho said or how he acted* But ■'ran lives in society andi
The peculiar end of society, therefore, is not only to 
secure respect fo r the Individual liberties and rights 
of every oitlsen, or to ensure material comfort, but 
also to procure the tru ly  human and therefore moral 
good of the social body* Liberty to practice any re li­
gion whatsoever indifferently (as thought the c iv il power 
were under no obligation, to the best of its  ab ility  
and without claiming any jurisdiction over c neciences, 
to Jo homage to tru th ), liberty  to express any opinion, 
liberty to print anything, lib erty  to tench any doctrine, 
arc a ll ,  therefore, oven in the eyes of c iv il society, 
thin-s contrary to nature.*
An individual in. society mast be aided by that society, which sub­
ordinates the temporal to the sp iritual, to attain  his fin a l and —
God TTirsc e lf* Society aids man by placing laws, about his
lTM j. ,  n* U a .
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daftiatimi liberty tm m  m  aarth la order that he attain a tii#« and 
perftoi liberty t§r solioitisgg. B%h# regulative oonirel of tfa» divine 
lm t both natural and rw a ltd #  and th» adnoatlva nonstwteit of the 
tamn State and the fiSbcafOh of ®*rtat»**X
I t  rsstaias «hHy to h® « M *  to eowMailng loha Stuart M ill*#  
olaiaa for lib o rif  of thought* wor4f and aet, "that anob cavers# sorts 
of .libartia f (indlsw lialw te lihsrtgrof thou&fe* writing* taad&lag*. • 
rallglons. uumhSp) em  fo r adequate reason be tolerated, provided that 
an ajsfnofarlst© operation prevent® %hm team, depwratlng into license 
and disorder#
b b ld ., p, 136.  
2TH<t.. p, U S,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
b i  b l i  o a a n ? n
PRIM ART SOURCES
M ill, John. Stuart, Autobiograrhy (Saw lorki Columbia University 
Press, 192li),
»tA System of Logie. ftatloelnatlve and Inductive (London* 
Longmans, Green and Go,, 1911)*
and
-.Bentham and Coleridge* Introduction by F. R. Leavi# 
»*Utilitarianism  (London* Longaan*e Careen, and Go*,
6th eET
  -—.Utilitarianism , Liberty, and Representative Government
(L o i^n r^*1 SC 'iient 'anJ'Sbne,' % !^rym ^
Madflnn, Way, J* R, Hainda, and J, McSab i'cCriaiaon, Bibliography 
of the Published Writings of John Stuart M ill (Svaiiston, i l l * i  
tiiaa^  'l#»5)♦’ "" ’..rn',,,r'n ""
s s n n u 'm  s m m m  
A* Books
Arts chut*, R« P., The Philosophy of C  5* B ill (Oxford* The Clarendon 
Press, 1953)*
Bain, Alexander, John Stuart M ill, A Criticism with Personal 
Recollect iovs' (London* XbniB*m*ar 'ffieimTantf Co.* j 'B j) .
Chesterton, Gilbert Keith, Victorian km of Literature* (London* 
Thornton Butterworth Ltd., Y93I) iStW'eT*’’1'"”
Power, Robert S», John Stuart R ytl, in "Social and P olitical Ideas 
of the Age of itcacii'on 'nnet Reconstruction", ed* by F.J.C, Hearn- 
ehm (Weir fork* Barnes and 'Joble, Inc ., 19li9),
79
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
30
Fawcett. M, 0 *. His Influence as a Practical Politician, in  "John
Stuart M ill, Tfi§rX̂ O1® aW  WorS« ' Twelve Sketches* (Boston*
James R. Osgood and Co*, 1873)*
Hayek. F. A** John "tuart M ill and Harriet Taylor (London* Routledge 
and K e g a n 'W T E rr B5TJ7------------------ ' -----
Maritain, Jacques, The Things That Are. Wot Caesar’s, trans* J* F, 
Scanlan (Hew Xor¥* V!&rtee ^ A td o r’ s 'Bom, i'931),
B* Periodical Literature
Anonymous, "M ill On LiVerty". The Dublin Review* X III*  New Series 
(London* Bums, Oates '
Anonymous, "Mr* M ill’ s Denial of Necessary Truth," The Dublin Review. 
XFII (London* Bums, Dates and Co*, 1871), 285-3W"
Anonymous* "Mr* M ill On The Foundations of Morality". The Dublin 
Review* OT1X (London* Burns, Oates and Co., lB72T, V*-16
Bower, Francis, "Mr. H ill and His Critics," 'Hie American 
Presbyterian and Theological Review, (New York* J. M*
M’Coeh, James, "M ill’ s Reply to His Critics," The American 
Presbyterian and Theological Review. X T O T H S T E E T
M ill, John Stuart, "On the Recent Persecution of Persons Vending 
Books Against Christianity, An Address to m ists, by a 
Dissenter," The Westminster Review, I I  (London* Baldwin,
Credock, and,""3oy7"miV""I«S7-------
——,"0n the Law of Libel and Freedom of the Press," The 
Westminster Review, I I I  (London* Baldwin, Cradock, an3"""
C. General Histories
Brehior, Bmile, Histoire de la PhiloBophle, VI (Paris* Idbrarie 
Felix Alcan,' no' ^ate)'*"
Robinson, Daniel Honrner, An Anthology of Modern Philosophy 
(New York * Thomas X. Crowell' Co., 1 9 3 1 ) '  '   " '
T h illy , F ,, A History of Philosophy (®ew fork* Henry Holt, 1?U3)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Cl
,vbcr.*oPt, P., A History of Philosophy lorki Scribners, 1388), 
Vol. 2.
P. General Roferenoee
The Cambridge History of English Literature, ed. by S ir A, W. Ward 
 C ‘'̂ l e r  67 K ' M m m«s Sons, 1917).
The dictionary of National Biography, ed. by Sir Leslie Stephen rnd 
& ir' Sidney "Lee' T^nSbnV l^iiard' university ftrest*, 1937)*
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
V I T A









S t. Clare Separate School 
Windsor, Ontario, 1931-39*
S t. Joseph*s High School 
Windsor, Ontario, 1939-U3*
Windsor Training and Rehab­
ilita tio n  Institu te, 19^6.




Wireless and Electrical Mech­
anic in  Hie Royal Canadian Air 
Force, October 19ii3 -  July 19U6.
Supply Officer in the Royal 
Canadian Naval Reserve,
January 1950 to the present.
82
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
